

Amsterdam, 08 April 2019
Commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Germany: Selected Migration Policies

Annex E to “Dutch labour market shortages and potential labour supply
from Africa and the Middle East” (SEO Report No. 2019-24)

Franck Düvell

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford
&
German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM), Berlin



seo amsterdam economics

“Solid research, Sound advice”

SEO Amsterdam Economics carries out independent applied economic research on behalf of national and international clients – both public institutions and private sector clients. Our research aims to make a major contribution to the decision-making processes of our clients. Originally founded by, and still affiliated with, the University of Amsterdam, SEO Amsterdam Economics is now an independent research group but retains a strong academic component. Operating on a nonprofit basis, SEO continually invests in the intellectual capital of its staff by granting them time to pursue continuing education, publish in academic journals, and participate in academic networks and conferences. As a result, our staff is fully up to date on the latest economic theories and econometric techniques.

Information & disclaimer

SEO Amsterdam Economics has not performed any research on the obtained information and data that would constitute an audit or due diligence. SEO is not responsible for errors or omissions in the obtained information and data.

Copyright © 2019 SEO Amsterdam. All rights reserved. Data from this report may be used in articles, studies and syllabi, provided that the source is clearly and accurately mentioned. Data in this report may not be used for commercial purposes without prior permission of the author(s). Permission can be obtained by contacting: secretariaat@seo.nl

Table of contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Skilled and highly skilled immigration programmes	7
2.1	Blue Card EU.....	9
2.2	Migrant labour recruitment policies.....	10
3	Social and labour market integration of immigrants and refugees	17
3.1	General integration.....	17
3.2	Economic integration	18
3.3	Characteristics of refugees of Syrian nationality	19
4	Lessons learned	21
	References	23

1 Introduction¹

This case study focuses on the lessons learned from two Germany migration policies: (1) highly-skilled immigration programmes, and (2) labour market integration of refugees, in particularly from Syria.

Labour demand in Germany tends to grow faster than labour supply. On the one hand, the German economy is one of the strongest in Europe and is projected to grow by 1.7-1.8 per cent annually.² On the other hand, the German population is rapidly ageing: while the share of the population over 65 is around one-third in 2018, this is projected to increase to over 40% in 2025 and could reach 60% in 2050. (Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung 2018).

According to a study published by Prognos in 2015, Germany will have a shortage of 1.8 million workers by 2025. This shortage would consist of 1.3 million with vocational training and another 500,000 with a university degree, while there would be an oversupply of unskilled workers.³

Another study, conducted by Economix Research & Consulting, on behalf of the German Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, estimated that the shortfall will only be 981,000 workers in 2025. This shortfall would again be overwhelmingly for workers with university degrees, but the study suggested rising demand for skilled workers by 2030. However, in case of accelerated digitalisation the demand for the highly-skilled would rise whereas demand for the low skilled would decrease. This study already took into account the arrival of large numbers of refugees from 2015-2016. This implies that by 2030, the majority of required workers will not need a university degree but other professional skills, and this is a growing trend. It is therefore argued that an increase in vocational training for indigenous workers, migrants and refugees is required.

The German media usually and frequently discusses matters within the discursive frame of a 'lack of skilled workers' and often refers to much higher figures, up to 4.9 million (e.g. FAZ 2015, Die Welt 2018). The Spiegel (2018a) reported that 34% of all businesses failed to recruit apprentices, hence their future workers. It is in this context that the German government has already piloted or currently implements some skilled workers recruitment programmes, and is considering a comprehensive and more far-reaching immigration act (e.g. FAZ 2018). The current debate focusses on the need for skilled and highly skilled migrant workers. A new paper by the coalition

¹ This chapter was prepared by Dr Franck Düvell from the University of Oxford's Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) and the German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM) Berlin. The report is based on desk research as well as two field trips to meet with key actors and experts. Telephone inquiries and interviews took place with experts from the following institutions:

- Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) (Hamburg), Mrs Julia Iversen, Mr Florian Krins
- Centre for Migration and Development (CIM), Eschborn
- Sequa gGmbH (Bonn), Mrs Veronique Chavane
- Ministry for Families, Elderly, Women and Youth, Mrs Tanya Florath
- Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), Mrs Christ, Mrs Simone Korting
- DEHOGA (German Hotel and Restaurant Association), Thuringen branch, Mr Muller
- Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) (Nurnberg), Dr Axel Kreienbrink

² See Statista (2018), <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/74644/umfrage/prognose-zur-entwicklung-des-bip-in-deutschland/>

³ Note that these projections were made in 2015 and did not yet take into account the influx of refugees in 2015 and 2016.

government on the ‘cornerstones of immigration of skilled worker from third countries’ notes that skilled labour migration from other EU member states is decreasing and thus suggests: (1) recruiting skilled and highly-skilled workers from third countries, (2) introduce job seeker visa, (3) invest in language courses as well as qualification programmes abroad, (4) invest in qualification programmes in Germany, and (5) offer avenues into employment for failed asylum seekers/tolerated immigrants (Bundesregierung 2018) whilst (6) maintaining the usual restrictions such as language requirements, certificates, priority of German workers tests in some professions, exclusion of certain regions, such as those with high levels of unemployment and exclusion from benefits⁴. The coming into force of such a law could potentially fundamentally alter the current policy, which is still primarily geared towards preventing migration, for instance by improving conditions in the sending countries⁵. The policies discussed below are thus rather exceptions to this rule.

In 2015,⁶ it was estimated that around 21% of the German population (17 out of 81 million residents), had a migration background.⁷ Out of these, 9.3 million were German nationals and 7.8 million were foreigners. In the same year, Germany recorded a flow of 1,810,904 immigrants (685,485 from the EU) and 568,639 emigrants (303,036 to the EU) (BAMF 2018c).⁸ By comparison, in 2014, 1.46 million persons immigrated and around 914,000 emigrated.

Apart from 2008 and 2009, net migration has been positive since 1991. Out of the total of 1.13 million non-EU immigrants, 419,098 were refugees. Out of the remainder 7.3% came for family reasons, 5.5% for education, and nearly 8% for employment.

Migration from Nigeria was stable from 1993 to 2010 and stood at around 2,000 annually but has increased to over 5,000 in 2014 and 11,000 in 2015. Migration from Tunisia has increased from an average of 2,500 between 1993 to 2011, to over 5,000 in 2015.

In 2015, the stock of non-EU foreign workers under §18 (qualified labour migration) was 94,112, another 2,837 under §19a for highly qualified academics, 26,791 held an EU Blue Card (§19b), 988 were researchers under §20 and 9,472 were self-employed actors under §21 (BAMF 2016). Another 50,832 persons entered under the employment decree (*Beschäftigungsverordnung*).⁹ By the end of 2017, the total of non-EU immigrants issued a residence permit for employment purposes stood at 126,184 (BAMF 2018c).

In 2015, a total of 42,365 foreign staff was employed by German universities; this figure has doubled since 2006. There were also 340,000 foreign national students and around 1 million foreign family members (cumulatively during 1998-2015).

⁴ As this paper is only a declaration no more details are yet known

⁵ This was clearly stated in the interviews with the Foreign Office, GIZ and Sequa

⁶ In 2016, no annual migration report was published due to a revision of the reporting practices and technical issues; the next report is only expected in fall 2018

⁷ Persons with at least one immigrant parent

⁸ Note that 2015 was an exceptional year due to the refugee crisis in the Middle East; notably, the figure includes around 477,000 asylum applications. Around 890,000 persons were registered as entering the country, of which around half applied for asylum in 2015, the other half in 2016, whilst at least 50,000 had already left the country.

⁹ Para2: 4,962; para 4: 1,205; para 6: 3,665; para 10: 9,111; para 11: 3,653; para 12: 7,701; para 25: 1,373; para 26: 7,885; para 27: 127; para 29: 10,700.

Table 1. Migration in Germany, 2015 and 2017

	Immigration	Emigration	Refugees	Family	Education	Employment
2015	1,810,904	568,639	419,000	82,440	61,642	38,805 (German Residence Law)
						50,832 (Employment decree)
2017	1,179,539	644,632				126,184 (total)

Source: BAMF 2016a¹⁰, BAMF 2018c

These numbers demonstrate that the vast majority of foreign labour does not arrive on an employment visa, but as asylum seekers or family members.

So far, German labour migration was mostly reactive and integrating those who were already in the country for other purposes, such as asylum seekers, family members or students. The only exception is the EU blue Card. Development and migration policies vis a vis third-countries were rather geared up to minimising migration. Amongst the few exceptions were small-scale recruitment projects of engineers, carers, hospitality workers and students and academics. However, the cornerstone paper by the government on skilled labour migration is going to change this and significant pro-active recruitment drives are to be expected, given the economic situation does not change dramatically.

¹⁰ Data for 2015 and 2017 is not strictly comparable because it is based on two different reports and two different types of data, stock data (2015) and flow data (2017). There is no comparable data for 2017 because the publications of the 2016 and 2017 migration reports have been delayed due to technical issues, see BAMF 2018e, <http://www.bamf.de/DE/DasBAMF/Forschung/Ergebnisse/Migrationsberichte/migrationsberichte-node.html>

2 Skilled and highly skilled immigration programmes

Germany regulates and facilitates the recruitment and immigration of highly skilled and skilled and partly even low-skilled foreign labour in several ways.

The German Residence Law (Aufenthaltsgesetz, “AufenthG”) distinguishes and regulates five types of qualified labour migration:

1. qualified (§18, no minimum income)
2. highly qualified (§19a)
3. EU Blue Card (§19b)
4. researchers (§20)
5. self-employed (§21).

In addition, the employment decree (Beschäftigungsverordnung, “BeschV”¹¹) distinguishes labour migrants by another nine types with some 30 subcategories:

1. academics (para 3)
2. leading personnel (para 4)
3. professionals (para 6)
4. intra-corporate transferees (para 10)
5. specialist professions (para 11)
6. au pairs (para 12)
7. artists (para 25)
8. cross-border commuters (para 27)
9. contract workers and guest workers (para 29).

A ‘Whitelist’ by the Federal Office for Employment (BA 2018c) specifies 114 “sought-after professions” ranging from carers, glaziers, plumbers, to metal workers and mechatronics. Currently, the inter-ministerial website ‘Make it in Germany’ which addresses prospective skilled migrant workers from EU and non-EU countries (see MfW 2018a) lists a total of 709,000 vacancies (as of 5/10/2018) (medical doctors, IT, engineers, vocational qualifications (MfW 2018b)). These vacancies reflect the 114 sought-after professions identified by the Federal Office for Employment.

Germany has had special recruitment programmes for highly skilled workers for many years. Already in 2000, Germany introduced such a recruitment programme. This so-called Green Card program operated from 2000–2004 and, at first, granted temporary work and residence permits to just under 18,000 foreign information technology professionals (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [BAMF] 2005). The target was to recruit 20.000 information technology professionals. In order to become a more attractive country of destination, the temporariness of the residence permit was lifted (Jurgens 2010). However, this programme was not perceived to be successful, as it was not competitive as compared to other migrant labour recruiting countries, and was therefore discontinued (DW 2015). Germany has since then adopted the 2012 EU Directive on Highly

¹¹ See https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/beschv_2013/

Qualified Workers and accordingly introduced a Blue Card EU to specifically attract highly-skilled workers. It is administered by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF 2018b) and implemented by the regional foreigners offices (Ausländerbehörden). The national admission criteria will be discussed in section 2.1 below.

In addition to this national policy, the EU agreed nine similar Mobility Partnerships (MPs) for (prospective) migrant sending countries, these are complemented by three Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) (EU Commission 2018). Tunisia, Jordan and Nigeria as well as Morocco are amongst the partner countries. Germany signed up to all of these.

MPs cover, among other things, ‘policy and legal frameworks for migration and mobility, including through circular and temporary migration schemes, as well as better information and protection of migrants, including pre-departure training’ (EU Commission 2018) and aim to ‘make mutual recognition of professional and university qualifications easier’ (EU Commission 2014). They are implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) of which Germany is a member state (unlike the Netherlands).

The key government agency in Germany implementing these policies is the Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) and notably its global programme ‘Migration for Development’ (PMD)¹² which is currently implemented in 24 partner countries (GIZ, no date)¹³. The programme is organised in two modules, (1) development-oriented migration and (2) informed return and reintegration¹⁴. Further to this the GIZ also runs Migration Advice Centres in seven countries¹⁵. Since 2015, these centres provided more than individual advice meetings and around 10,000 persons participated in job application trainings¹⁶. They advise on migration opportunities, jobs searches, job interview training, vocational and language training opportunities, returnees and on start-up support. It thus has a strong return focus, although it seems so far that no ‘more than 15,000 returning experts’ are recorded (GIZ, no date) (also see CIM, no date¹⁷).

In the context, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ran the model project ‘German Tunisia Mobility Pact’ from 2014-2016 which aimed at recruiting highly-skilled migrants from Tunisia. Similar programmes are piloted in other countries. The ministry adopted a bottom-up approach to provide vocational and language training delivered by private and NGO implementing partners. This led to some programmes now run by employers. Germany is also one of the 17 EU member states which signed the EU-Jordan mobility partnership and issues the highest number of Schengen visa to Jordanians. In addition, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) engages in recruiting scientists. Meanwhile, the International Placement Services (ZAV) of the Federal Employment Agency (BA 2018d) with its specialised teams in Essen, Cologne, Frankfurt/Main, Munich and Stuttgart further supports international job seekers.

¹² The PMD runs from 2015-2020, see <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/62318.html>

¹³ The programme is implemented in Afghanistan, Albania, Ethiopia, Ecuador, Georgia, Ghana, Iraq, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Cameroon, Kenya, Colombia, Kosovo, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Palästine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Tunisia, Ukraine and Vietnam

¹⁴ See footnote 10

¹⁵ Albania, Ghana, Senegal (since January 2018), Kosovo, Serbia, Tunisia, Morocco and Iraq, more are planned to be opened, also see GIZ 2018, <https://www.giz.de/en/mediacenter/64714.html>

¹⁶ See footnote 10

¹⁷ Also see <https://www.cimonline.de/en/html/migration-advice-centres.html>

In sum, the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the Blue Card EU, the mobility partnerships and a range of national agencies and initiatives are applied in conjunction and thus provide a comprehensive migration facilitation tool for Germany.

2.1 Blue Card EU

Already in 2000, Germany introduced a so-called 'Green Card' for highly-skilled workers; how this only attracted 17,931 workers, was considered too cumbersome, not competitive and thus discontinued in 2005 (DW 2015). In 2012, Germany introduced the EU's 2009 Blue Card directive. By the end of 2015, 87 % of all EU Blue Cards were issued by Germany, by 2017, this has not changed. Whilst in 2016, Germany issued 17,630 Blue Cards the Netherlands only issued 42, but uses a national highly skilled migration scheme (*Kennismigrantenregelung*). In the absence of a national scheme for the highly skilled, Germany has thus been making best use of this EU regulation; other countries such as the Netherlands instead prioritise national schemes. During the first 40 months, 38,000 Blue Cards were issued, 53,704 by 2017, usually to persons with a university degree (two third in mathematics, IT, natural science or technical professions), and 90% of the blue Card holders were employed by companies registered in Germany. In 2018, the stock of EU Blue Card holders reached 107.642 (BAMF 2018c). However, because only 4% of all immigrants entered under the Blue Card scheme Bonin from the Institute for the Future of labour (IZA) argues 'without question: the blue card is not yet strongly used' (FAZ 2018). It is thus, so far, no major instrument of migration management.

The conditions of a Blue Card application vary significantly across the EU. In Germany, the fee is €140, it is valid for 48 month and puts the income threshold at €52,000 (annually, before tax, but this is significantly less for scarcity professions like engineers); in comparison, so far, the Netherlands charged €950 (by far the highest fee, and more than twice as high as the second highest fee, €418 in Spain), but this has meanwhile been reduced to €582. The Netherlands also issue cards for 48 months but set the income threshold at €66,874. For the Blue Card no German language skills are required. Finally, Germany drops the requirement of priority checks for indigenous workers (so far, if not stated otherwise, all data from Stitteneder 2018). In Germany, a website informs about the recognition of foreign certificates¹⁸; there is also a network of advice agencies on this matter.¹⁹

Of all Blue Card holders, 80 % were men and 75 % were married or with a partner. About 20 % converted the blue card into a permanent residence card within the first 40 month (e.g. FAZ 2018). In 2015, Blue Card holders originated from India (20.4%), Russia (11.4%), Ukraine (8.6%), China (6.5%), USA (5.3%), Serbia (4.7%) and Syria (2.4%) (BAMF 2016) whilst 275 (1.1%) were from Jordan (Hanganu & Hess 2016). Around 30 % have previously studied in Germany and thus, know language and culture; Syrians, Egyptians and citizens from other Middle Eastern countries displayed the highest level of German language proficiency whereas another 24.1% spoke no or little German, notably Indians and Japanese (Hanganu & Hess 2016).

¹⁸ See <http://www.erkennung-in-deutschland.de> (05.11.2015)

¹⁹ See http://anabin.kmk.org/no_cache/filter/erkennungsuund-beratungsstellen-in-deutschland.html

Table 2. Indians, Russians, Ukrainians and Chinese held the largest share of Blue Cards in Germany in 2015

India	Russia	Ukraine	China	USA	Serbia	Turkey	Egypt	Syria	Jordan
20.4	11.4	8.6	6.5	5.3	4.7	3.9	3.3	2.4	1.1

Source: BAMF 2016²⁰

Additionally, Germany fast tracks highly skilled labour migrants such as those holding a Blue Card, into permanent residence within three years or even 21 months depending on their integration and language skills (§19a, para 6, residence act) instead of making them wait the full five years commonly used. In exceptional cases (if integration is taken for granted) this can even be reduced to zero years meaning that a settlement permit can be issued immediately (see §19, para 1 Residence act).

Finally, a survey by the BAMF (Hanganu & Hess 2016) suggest that for Blue Card holders the quality of live (81.5%), economic conditions (69.3%), a job offer (66.9%) and welfare (64.9%) were the most powerful attractions. It also implies that the holders of a Blue Card, the immigrants, have been rather satisfied: 76.6% were satisfied or very satisfied and only 9.3% dissatisfied with the atmosphere at work, this suggests successful integration at work. Another 84.6% were satisfied with the job (ibid.), 62.4% were satisfied with the salaries but 11.8% were dissatisfied whilst about a third were unhappy with information and visa formalities. It appears that for interested highly skilled migrants the German version of the Blue Card is more competitive and also more attractive than in other member states though these findings suggest that there is still scope for improvements.

2.2 Migrant labour recruitment policies

In recent years, Germany has begun piloting or establishing projects and programmes in third countries aiming at recruiting certain types of labour migrants. However, the interviewees from the Foreign Office, GIZ and Sequa²¹ as confirmed by the number of programmes and breadth of its engagement in third countries, the focus of such programmes – most clearly in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt - clearly lies in policies diminishing the need to migrate and instead contribute to set up economic and political development initiatives and specifically contribute to employment partnerships and programmes bringing women into (better) employment.

2.2.1 German Tunisia Mobility Pact

Under the German-Tunisia Transformation Partnership, the German government implements various programmes and projects, all with the aim to foster transformation, improve conditions in the respective country and diminish migration²².

In contrast, the German Tunisia Mobility Pact was commissioned by the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs and implemented by the Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) from 2012

²⁰ Data for 2016 or 2017 has not yet been published, see footnote 6

²¹ Interviews with Mr Krins (GIZ), 4/10/18, Mrs Christ (FO), 5/10/18 and Mrs Chavane (Sequa), 5/10/18

²² Telephone conversation with Mrs Christ, FCO, 5/10/18

to 2016 to facilitate labour migration of the highly skilled²³. It was meant to be a project-type model programme with finite funding and thus a fixed end date. Thus far, there has been no follow-up.

The starting point of this policy was that in Tunisia unemployment continues to be widespread, while in Germany many companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), are desperately seeking skilled personnel, for example in the STEM professions²⁴. Demographic changes were expected to exacerbate this 'growing shortage of specialists' (GIZ 2012a).

The aim of the programme was to

- advise Tunisian professionals on life and work in Germany';
- provide language courses and internships for highly skilled professionals;
- advise the Tunisian Employment Agency on Possibilities for international job placement; and
- raise the German private sector's awareness of the potential of Tunisian professionals' (GIZ 2012b).

It aimed, to 'give the opportunity to increase their prospects of employment in Germany' first, 'by taking an intensive language course in Tunisia' and second, by 'gaining professional experience through a three-month internship in Germany' and third, 'after this introductory phase, the German employers have the opportunity to employ the highly skilled professionals on a permanent basis at their companies' (ibid: 2). The programme only 'focuses on young engineers'. Diverse actors in public partnership with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the GIZ provided language course (Goethe Institute), vocational training as well as information tools (Sequa GmbH).

Demand for the programme was huge but due to funding restrictions only two groups with a total of 201 participants benefitted, of which 73% were finally employed, and 27% returned after the internships (but out of these, several found jobs in Tunisia including jobs at German businesses). Here, experiences were said to be very good, notably employers were very satisfied although demand was much higher than what GIS was able to deliver.

This initiative was implemented by the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs but with a strong role for the Ministry of Labour. The combined involvement of the MfA and MoL signals that the key angles of the programme combine international relations, transition support and development considerations with German labour market considerations.

²³ It was complemented by a Tunisia Employment pact aiming to enhance employment opportunities in Tunisia, see https://www.sequa.de/images/stories/140224_fr_flyer_Einzelseiten_2014.pdf . The programme covers welding, prosthetics, solar energy, tourism, and food production

²⁴ Science, Technology, Engineering and Math

Box 2.1 Interview with Julia Iversen, GIZ, Hamburg, on mobility partnerships

GIZ implements a whole range of mobility partnership programmes as with Tunisia, Morocco, Vietnam and the Philippines; it also prepares a new programme in Nigeria though there is not yet any experience. Further to this, its main activities in this field concern vocational training; for instance, the GIZ is very strongly engaged in Jordan. These mobility partnerships are inspired by the triple-win dogma meaning that sending and receiving societies and migrants gain from migration, for instance, through fair labour migration (in this context, fair means that equal wages are paid, that no indigenous workers are displaced and that brain drain is avoided, for instance, by consulting WHO red lists). However, there is a conflict of interest in that employers usually prefer long-term labour migration whereas sending countries prefer return migration whilst the receiving country usually prefers temporary migration. But so far, the economic requirements and the employers' aspirations prevail.

So far, the mobility partnerships only run pilot projects which recruit and prepare staff by way of language courses and inter-cultural training for internships. Most costs are covered by the employers. The internships are relatively low risk for both sides (employers make no commitment and migrants can return but they are meant to result in subsequent recruitment. The programme aims to establish structures that can be continued by the employers. However, only major employers like hospitals or some chambers of industries have such capacity whereas SMEs don't have this. Therefore, public agencies continue to play a major role in facilitating such programmes, whereas the Tunisia programme only targeted highly skilled migrants (engineers) most programmes rather target medium skilled workers (carers, nurses, hospitality, and craftsmen). It is suggested that this category will grow in importance.

Language requirements are so far inconsistent and can range from B1 to B2 though employers usually prefer B2. Language is stated by employers as a key issue followed by technical competencies. Cultural competences are not normally considered an issue. Generally, employers are very satisfied with the migrant workers they recruit.

There is a tricky balance between recruiting trained staff but then be troubled with skills recognition and retraining issues, developing training partnerships and providing training in the sending countries (employers are less enthusiastic in funding this) or training future staff in Germany (which employers seem to prefer as then they can determine the quality of the training).

Key lessons learned or concerns are:

1. Perfect supply-demand matching is key.
2. Do not under estimate the importance of language acquisition, failure rate is 30 %.
3. In order to be successful such programmes require strong private partner/business engagement and commitment.
4. In future, such programmes also require intercultural training of employers.
5. Such programmes require strong operational structures in the sending as well as the receiving context and close collaboration of employment agencies. It also requires a structure to provide advice to employers.
6. Lack of language teachers leading to bottle necks in the provision of language courses is currently the biggest barrier to extending such programmes. Language courses require up to half of the programme budgets.

Another related ongoing programme facilitates recruiting carers. Set up in 2013, it provides language courses, short care courses and recognition of qualifications to would-be migrants as well as supporting receiving businesses in developing integration and welcoming measures. It is implemented across four countries (Bosnia Hercegovina, Philippines, Tunisia, Serbia). So far, a total of 1,300 carers were recruited for 200 hospitals and care homes²⁵. Amongst them are an unknown number of Tunisians.

Whereas the mobility pact has meanwhile ended a national Migration Advice Centre has been established. However, its activity is less in the field of recruitment but rather to promote local alternatives to migration²⁶.

Box 2.2 Interview with Florian Krins, GIZ, on recognition of certificates

The policy aim is to engage with countries that have education and vocational training systems and thus generate certificates similar to Germany. To this end fact finding missions visit the respective countries to test education and training systems. All information on schools, universities and training facilities and their courses, curricula and certificates is stored in the ANABIN data bank (also see footnote 17). This is compared with the German equivalent in order to establish the level of congruence. Accordingly, additional qualification needs are identified and courses set up to re-qualify as necessary to address the divergence. These last 6 to 12 months depending on the country of origin of the prospective worker. The aim to finance the pilot by the government but successively transfer responsibility and funding to the benefiting businesses. Currently, there are considerations to also offer such qualification courses in the sending countries

2.2.2 Training, Education and Employment projects and policies in other countries

While the German-Moroccan mobility partnership negotiations appears to have stagnated,²⁷ there is one labour migration programme rolled out in Morocco. In 2016, a pilot project ‘Supporting Young Moroccans in Employment and Training Opportunities in Scarcity Jobs in Germany’ funded by the World Bank’s MENA Transition Fund was agreed between the GIZ and the Moroccan employment agency (*Agence nationale de promotion de l’emploi et des compétences*, ANAPEC) and in cooperation with two regional branches of the DEHOGA (German Association of Hotels and Catering) in Thüringen and Bavaria²⁸.

More than 400 young Moroccans applied to the programme. In the end, 110 school leavers - at least some with high school certificates - were selected for participation in a vocational programme in the tourism industry for jobs that are categorised in Germany as ‘scarcity’ jobs. The programme first provided a six months language and intercultural preparation module in Morocco before sending the participants to Germany for a 3-year conventional dual (school and work) training.

²⁵ See GIZ 2018, <https://www.giz.de/de/mediathek/65817.html>

²⁶ For general information on Migration Advice Centres see <https://www.cimonline.de/en/html/migration-advice-centres.html>, for the activities of the MAC in Tunisia see <https://www.facebook.com/Cetunal/>

²⁷ See German embassy, Morocco, <https://rabat.diplo.de/ma-de/themen/willkommen/laenderinfos/aussenpolitik>

²⁸ For a short project description see GIZ 2016, <https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/Deutsch-Marokkanische%20Ausbildungspartnerschaft.pdf>

Early indications are that the programme is a success. It commenced in the summer of 2017, and by the summer of 2018, as many as 97 participants were still in the course. This is a high retention rate, as the drop-out rate of Germans is said to be significantly higher. By the end of the course, the participants can either be offered a job at the business where they are placed, or return to Morocco to find a job there. For the purpose of their training, the participants were issued a residence permit for three years due to be extended in case they were offered a job once training is completed²⁹. Because it is a rather recent programme, no conclusions can be drawn yet regarding the effectiveness of the programme.

Box 2.3 Interview with Mr. Müller, German Hotel and Restaurant Association

“The programme went very well. Very few people dropped. Several had previous experience in the sector. None had previous vocational training; therefore, recognition of certificates was not an issue. The selection process was very strict. The employers were in Morocco and involved in the selection and recruitment. Applicants were checked for their dealing with women and whether they accept female superiors, whether they would prepare and try pork meat and alcohol. This is essential if they want to work in kitchens or restaurants. But there were no problems.”

“The project was completely funded by the World Bank. We would like to continue such a project. It could be partly financed by the employers but not completely. The employers in this sector are small and medium size businesses with limited resources. Without funding from the public purse, this would not be possible”.

In Egypt, the main activity with regard to mobility and migration is the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Since 2007, there are four programmes representing a well-established framework facilitating the mobility of over 1.500 academics from both countries. In 2018, there were 1,800 Egyptian students including 550 PhD students enrolled at German universities³⁰. Though these programmes do not specifically aim at recruiting highly-skilled labour migrants the employment decree does facilitate them to continue residing and working in Germany. This is further supported by German language education. In total, 900,000 young Egyptians are taught German at school whereas 12,000 Egyptians study German at university³¹.

Germany is also particularly active on the West Balkans, notably, Albania, Bosnia Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. From 2016 to 2020, the Federal Employment office runs a specific a labour migration scheme in these countries³². Noting that from these countries there are significant numbers of asylum seekers - who are usually rejected as these are categorised as “safe countries” – it is explained that instead citizens of these countries are entitled to apply for any kind of jobs in Germany. They are thus excepted from the usual requirements, for instance, under the “scarcity jobs” rules; all they need is a job offer and a visa. In 2017, ‘about 35.000 visa

²⁹ See GIZ 2018, <https://www.giz.de/de/mediathek/68745.html> ; also see Thüringer Landeszeitung, <https://www.tlz.de/web/zgt/leben/detail/-/specific/Diese-Investition-zahlt-sich-langfristig-aus-1941101287>

³⁰ See website of the German embassy in Egypt, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/egypten-node/-/212610>

³¹ Ibid.

³² See Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, <https://www3.arbeitsagentur.de/web/content/DE/service/Ueberuns/WeitereDienststellen/ZentraleAulandsundFachvermittlung/Arbeit/ArbeiteninDeutschland/WestbalkanRegelung/index.htm>

were issue but ‘demand was much higher’ (no figure was given)³³. An evaluation is ongoing but not yet concluded³⁴.

2.2.3 EU Jordan Mobility Partnership

The EU Jordan Mobility partnership has been signed up by 12 EU member states including Germany.³⁵ It complements the EU-Jordan Compact from 2016-2018 which is meant to further enhancing the EU-Jordan Partnership priorities. The Compact aims to ‘improve the socio-economic prospects, security, stability and resilience of Jordan’ and specifically to ‘improve the living conditions both of Syrian refugees in Jordan ...and of vulnerable host communities’ (EU Commission 2016).

Strictly speaking, the Compact is not a mobility programme as such, but primarily aims at improving the lives of Jordanians and Syrian refugees. It supports, for instance, the enrolment of 1,390 students in higher education and some 5,000 in vocational training. EU support for higher education is provided through Erasmus+ and E+ Credit mobility schemes that have benefited 140 Jordanian staff and 386 Jordanian students. Education support contracts are specifically set up with the German Jordanian University in addition to activities implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the German Academic Exchange Service’ (ibid) and involve about 135 German higher education institutions. Thereby, the Compact and adjacent initiatives also foster mobility and is one of the pathways to a Blue Card EU, though not intentionally and only to a small extent.

Unfortunately, no information could be found on the EU-Jordan Mobility Partnership. Even though the author called the Foreign Office, the GIZ, the Centre on International Migration and Development (CIM) and the Federal Office for Employment several times no officer knew about the partnership and thus nobody could provide any information. It seems thus fair to conclude that the partnership is not (yet) actually implemented.

Collett and Ahad (2017) from the Brussels-based Migration Policy Institute are indeed sceptical with regards to the mobility partnerships. As their aims are suggested to be mainly to enhance border controls, facilitate return of irregular immigrants and prevent migration they are not actually well designed to facilitate migration. ‘Despite the name, few of these projects involve provisions for legal mobility’ (ibid.: 5).

³³ See Bundesregierung, <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/020/1902018.pdf>, page 5

³⁴ See IAB <https://www.iab.de/138/section.aspx/Projekttdetails/k180109310>

³⁵ Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. No information is found on the implementation or effect of the partnership

3 Social and labour market integration of immigrants and refugees

In 2015, Germany accepted 2.14 immigrants; in 2015/2016, 1.3 million applications for asylum were recorded (flow data), one third from Syrians, only 1.7 % were Nigerians. By December 2017, 890,000 still resided in the country (stock data). Until 2022, the government expects to invest €47 bn. (€21 bn. for welfare, €13 bn. for integration and €5.2 for accommodation (Der Spiegel, 2018b). The integration of refugees is expected to take around 5 years, the outcome is said to be mixed with some economic and social integration but also some persistent levels of unemployment, an increase of 0.8% is predicted, only to be diminished by the second generation (Economics 2018) of even only after 20 years (OECD 2017). The Economix (2018) study nevertheless expects that the successful integration of refugees will contribute an annual 0.25% increase of the GDP.

3.1 General integration

In order to facilitate migrant and refugee social and labour market integration, Germany developed specific legislation (e.g. 2004 *Integrationskursverordnung*), policies and politics (including public-private partnerships and voluntarism). The German policy with regards to labour market integration of refugees has somewhat changed from a more exclusive to a more inclusive approach. In the past, barriers for entering the labour market were rather high whereas now policy rather facilitates labour market integration, notably the threshold for obtaining permission to work has been lowered to three months. The Economix (2016) study argues that there is ‘no alternative’ to the integration of refugees; otherwise the economic impact, notably on unemployment, as well as for the ageing population and shrinking workforce will be negative.

Since 2005, 1.9 million people participated in German integration courses, whereas 1.6 million passed. This suggests that around 300,000 or 16% either failed or dropped out; however, most will have repeated the course and/or exam (BAMF 2018). In addition, several hundred thousand persons who were eligible nevertheless did not yet take the course. Out of the total, 593,000 also passed the B2 language test (all Degler et al. 2017).

In 2016, 339,500 persons participated in the integration courses and 292,000 in 2017. Out of the latter, nearly 99,000 were voluntary and the remainder were compulsory participants. Out of the total, 77,000 took a literacy course, suggesting they could not read and write properly. Syrians represent the largest share among participants of integration courses (46% in 2016 and 101,000 or 34.6% in 2017). The second largest group are Iraqis (9.4%) whilst Afghans (6.9%) come third. EU nationals - the largest groups are from Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Greece - represent around 60,000.

Some preliminary research³⁶ suggests that some categories of immigrants and refugees reject the integration courses. Common reasons for rejecting the courses are because they (a) do not see their

³⁶ Schmidt, Timo (2018), *Integration policy and migrant aspirations*, MSc thesis, University of Oxford

future in Germany, (b) have to prioritise work, (c) worry about family members still abroad and in situations of distress, and (d) some women are prevented by their husbands to participate in the courses.

3.2 Economic integration

Germany has considerably relaxed labour market access conditions for asylum seekers – except those from origin countries considered “safe” – who can get permission to work after just three months (Degler et al. 2017).

Thus far, the German experience suggests important differences in the employability of diverse refugee nationalities. By June 2018, a total of 254,000 refugees were employed and a further 73,000 persons were in minor employment³⁷. Another 180,000 asylum seekers were registered as unemployed and 482,000 as job seekers (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2018a)³⁸. The latter were usually registered in language and/or integration courses or training and therefore not registered as unemployed.

Between June 2017 and June 2018, 90,000 asylum seekers entered employment, about one in five of those who were seeking a job in 2017. Of the non-European foreigners in employment 73,003 were Syrians, 42,499 Afghans, 31,402 Iraqis, 25,028 Iranians, 20,555 Pakistanis, 15,245 Eritreans, 14,608 Nigerians and 6,726 Somalis (April 2017) (including refugees and other categories of immigrants) (April 2018) (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2018b).

So far, the proportion of workers from refugee generating countries is minimal. A total of nearly 230,000 or 0.7% of all employees were from refugee generating countries. Nearly another 800,000 were from other non-EU European countries (excluding Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and Balkan countries).

Table 3.1: Refugee country nationalities in German employment, April 2018

Syrians	Afghans	Iraqis	Iranians	Pakistanis	Eritreans	Nigerians	Somalis
73,003	42,499	31,402	25,028	20,555	15,245	14,608	6,726

Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2018b

While the employment rate of Pakistanis was highest and stood at 41% followed by Nigerians 37.4% and Iranians at 35.2%. The employment rate for Syrians was only 21.6% and thus lowest amongst the top eight nationalities of refugees. Overall, the employment rate of foreigners was 48.7% and that of German citizens 68.2%.

The relatively low employment rate of Syrians could probably be explained by their only recent arrival in the country, going through the asylum process, attending integration and language courses

³⁷ Minor employment is characterised as a special kind of contract, tax free, with minimum deductions, income €400, so called mini-jobs or 400 EURO jobs.

³⁸ German employment law distinguished between job seeking (*arbeitssuchend*) and unemployed (*arbeitslos*). Job seeking usually refers to individuals still in education, training or employment though they are nearing the end of their term and thus register as seeking a (new job). Unemployed individual are already without a job, they are therefore not only seeking employment but usually also apply for according unemployment benefits.

and then undergo (re)training where necessary takes at least 3 and up to 5 years (Economix 2016). It is also suggested that families are often separated, meaning that the member in Germany is primarily concerned with the well-being and subsequent family reunification, which distracts people from taking integration courses and seeking employment.

Table 3.2: Employment rates of citizens, foreigners and refugees in comparison in %, 2018

German citizens	Foreigners	Pakistanis	Nigerians	Syrians
68.2	48.7	41	37.4	21.6

Source: Economix 2016

3.3 Characteristics of refugees of Syrian nationality

A study by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF 2016) on the ‘social component’ of all asylum applicants in 2015 suggests that 17.8% had a university degree and a further 51.9% had secondary education. Out of all Syrian applicants, the following statistics are of interest:

- 26% had higher education (women 23.8%); only Iranians displayed higher educational levels;
- another 52.6% had secondary education (women 51.2%);
- 41% spoke some English and 1.1% some German
- 78.8% were male
- 52.9% were married
- 49.4% were between 18 and 27 years old
- 73.2% of the men and 29.5% of the women had been in employment (both figures are below average, mainly because of the higher level of young people still being in education).

Figure 3.1: Profile of Syrian refugee population in Germany, 2015

Higher Education 26% had higher education (women 23.8%) (with weighting 23.2%)	Secondary Education 52.6% secondary education (women 51.2%) (with weighting 50.4%)	Employment 73.2% of the men and 29.5% of the women had been in employment prior migration	Language Skills 41% spoke some English and 1.1% some German
Gender 78.8% were male	Age 49.4% were between 18 and 27 years old	Family Status 52.9% were married	

Source: BAMF 2016

Several nationalities turned out to be predominantly of urban middleclass background and well-educated. This is particularly the case for Iranians, Pakistanis and Syrians. Syrian asylum seekers in Germany generally had an education well above the average. This broadly reflects the educational level of the citizens in Syria.

4 Lessons learned

Based on desk research, interviews and analysis, there are six key lessons that could be drawn from the German experience:

1. The EU Blue Card turned out to be a success in Germany—more so than the previous national Green Card. It attracted a significant number of highly skilled migrants. It also appears to be a good strategy to combine the EU Blue card with other national initiatives, notably those aiming at only skilled labour migrants.
2. The EU mobility partnerships are hardly implemented. Instead, the recruitment of labour migrants is managed under various other programmes. This suggests that tailor-made programmes may be better suited to address skills needs.
3. There appears to be a tension between state interests and employer interests. The first mainly focus on facilitating temporary migration, while the second generally prefer long-term immigration in order to minimise staff turn-over and maximise returns from investments into (re)training.
4. Public-private partnerships, notably employers taking over existing legal migration channels, only work for large employers or employer associations. They do not appear to work for SME employers who lack the resources.
5. There are two key steps to labour market integration of refugees: (1) integration into basic employment, and (2) catching up with the general population. Both takes several years and requires significant investments.
6. The integration of refugees appears to be obstructed or slowed down due to their traumatic experiences, family separation, and their worries over those left behind.

References

- Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung (2018), *Alterung der Bevölkerung*, Berlin: BIBE, <https://www.berlin-institut.org/online-handbuchdemografie/bevoelkerungsdynamik/auswirkungen/alterung.html>
- Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Agency for Labour) (2018a), *Statistik/Arbeitsmarktberichterstattung Berichte: Arbeitsmarkt kompakt – Fluchtmigration*, Nürnberg: BA, <https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statischer-Content/Statistische-Analysen/Statistische-Sonderberichte/Generische-Publikationen/Fluchtmigration.pdf>
- Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2018b), *Statistik/Arbeitsmarktberichterstattung, Berichte: Arbeitsmarkt kompakt – Auswirkungen der Migration auf den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt*, Nürnberg: BA, <https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statischer-Content/Statistische-Analysen/Statistische-Sonderberichte/Generische-Publikationen/Auswirkungen-der-Migration-auf-den-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf#page=18>
- Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) (2018c), *Whitelist immigration into recognised occupations*, https://con.arbeitsagentur.de/prod/apok/ct/dam/download/documents/whitelist_ba015790.pdf
- Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) (2018d), *Admission to the German labour market*, <https://www3.arbeitsagentur.de/web/content/EN/WorkingandJobSeeking/WorkinginGermany/Detail/index.htm?dfContentId=L6019022DSTBAI776745>
- Bundesamt für Migration and Flüchtlinge (BAMF) (2016a), *Migrationsbericht 2015*, Nürnberg: BAMF, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2015.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2016b), *Asylerstantragsteller in Deutschland im Jahr 2015. Sozialstruktur, Qualifikationsniveau und Berufstätigkeit Kurzanalyse*, https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Kurzanalysen/kurzanalyse3_sozial-komponenten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) (2018), *Bericht zur Integrationskursgeschäftsstatistik für das Jahr 2017*, Nürnberg: BAMF, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Integration/2017/2017-integrationskursgeschaeftsstatistik-gesamt_bund.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
- Bundesagentur für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF 2018a), *Zahlen zur Blauen Karte EU*, <http://www.bamf.de/DE/Infothek/Statistiken/BlaueKarteEU/blaue-karte-eu-node.html>

- Bundesamt für Migration and Flüchtlinge (2018b), *Blaue Karte EU*, Nürnberg: BAMF, <http://www.bamf.de/DE/Migration/Arbeiten/BuergerDrittstaat/BlaueKarte/blaue-karte-node.html>
- BAMF (2018c), *Wanderungsmonitor, Erwerbsmigration nach Deutschland*, Nürnberg: BAMF, <http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Broschueren/wanderungsmonitoring-2017.pdf?blob=publicationFile>
- Bundesagentur für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) (2018d), *Bericht zur Integrationskursgeschäftsstatistik für das Jahr 2017*, Nürnberg: BAMF, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Integration/2017/2017-integrationskursgeschaeftsstatistik-gesamt_bund.pdf?blob=publicationFile
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (BfW) (2018a), *In demand: Experts with vocational qualifications*, <https://www.make-it-in-germany.com/en/for-qualified-professionals/working/demanded-professions/needed-vocational-qualifications>
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (BfW) (2018b), *Job listings*, https://www.make-it-in-germany.com/en/for-qualified-professionals/working/job-listings?tx_rsmiig_jobmarket%5B%40widget_0%5D%5BcurrentPage%5D=2&cHash=32cf7d34d8a078a8eae150f3b24527a9
- Bundesregierung (2018), *Eckpunkte zur Fachkräfteeinwanderung aus Drittstaaten*, 2/10/2018, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2018/eckpunkte-fachkraefteeinwanderung.pdf;jsessionid=DF6B414605A6052EC8C0ED253E218408.2_cid295?blob=publicationFile&v=1
- Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) (no date), *Returning experts*, <https://www.cimonline.de/en/html/returning-experts.html>
- Collett, Elizabeth; Ahah, Aliyyah (2017), *EU migration partnerships. Work in progress*, Brussels: MPI Europe, www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/FTCM-EUMigrationPartnerships-FINAL.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3ih4Kicuei0S0gHGYuKxUU
- Degler, Eva; Liebig, Thomas; Senner, Anne-Sophie (2017), *Integrating Refugees into the Labour Market - Where Does Germany Stand?*, *IFO DICE Report* 3(15): 6, <http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-3-degler-liebig-senner-october.pdf>
- DW (Deutsche Welle) (2015), *Die Lehren aus dem Greencard-Flop*, 1/8/2015, <https://www.dw.com/de/die-lehren-aus-dem-greencard-flop/a-18616952>
- Economix Research & Consulting (2016), *Arbeitsmarkt 2030*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, <http://www.economix.org/assets/content/Arbeitsmarkt%202030/Vogler->

- Ludwig%20et%20al%202016%20Arbeitsmarkt%202030%20-%20Wirtschaft%20und%20Arbeitsmarkt%20im%20digitalen%20Zeitalter.pdf
- EU Commission (2018), *Migration partnership facilitation*, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/mobility-partnership-facility_en
- EU Commission (2016), *EU Jordan partnership: the Compact*, <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/jordan-compact.pdf>
- EU Commission (2014), EU-Jordan: a new partnership to better manage mobility and migration, Press release 9/10/2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1109_en.htm
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (2015), *Deutschland braucht mehr Arbeitskräfte*, 21/5/2015, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/beruf-chance/beruf/neue-prognose-deutschland-braucht-mehr-arbeitskraefte-13603140.html>
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (2018), *Union und SPD planen Einwanderungsgesetz*, 9/1/2018, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/union-und-spd-einigen-sich-offenbar-auf-einwanderungsgesetz-15382575.html>
- GIZ (no date), *Programme 'Migration for Development'*, <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/62318.html>
- GIZ (2012a), *German-Tunisian Mobility Pact. Gain capacities, create perspectives*, <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/19727.html>
- GIZ (2012b), *German-Tunisian Mobility Pact Gain Capacities, Create Perspectives*, <https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2015-en-german-tunisian-mobility-pact.pdf>
- Hanganu, Elisa; Heß, Barbara (2016), *Die Blaue Karte EU in Deutschland. Kontext und Ergebnisse der BAMF-Befragung*, Nürnberg: BAMF, https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fb27-blaue-karte-eu.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
- Jeffrey Jurgens (2010), The legacies of labor recruitment: The guest worker and green card programs in the Federal Republic of Germany, *Policy and Society*, 29(4): 345-355, DOI: 10.1016/j.polsoc.2010.09.010
- OECD (2017), *Finding their Way. Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Labour-Market-Integration-Refugees-Germany-2017-de.pdf>
- Prognos (2015), *Arbeitslandschaft 2040*, Berlin: Prognos, <https://www.prognos.com/publikationen/alle-publikationen/609/show/6321c200501f82651dd7b461b0034161/>

- Rich, Anna-Katharina (2016), *First-time asylum applicants in Germany 2015: Social structure, level of qualifications and employment*, Brief Analysis 3/2016, Nürnberg: BAMF, https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Kurzanalysen/kurzanalyse3_sozial-komponenten.pdf?blob=publicationFile
- Stitteneder, Tanja (2018), *Die Blaue Karte EU: Ein länderübergreifender Überblick*, Munich: CESIFO, <https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/sd-2018-06-stitteneder-eu-blue-card-2018-03-22.pdf>
- Spiegel, Der (2018a), *Azubi-Mangel: Jeder dritte Betrieb findet keine Lehrlinge*, 18/7/2018, <http://www.spiegel.de/karriere/azubi-mangel-jeder-dritte-betrieb-findet-keinen-lehrling-a-1219008.html>
- Spiegel, Der (2018b), *Flüchtlingskrise soll Bund 78 Milliarden Euro kosten*, <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/fluechtlinge-fluechtlingskrise-wird-haushalt-auf-jahre-belasten-a-1208489.html>
- Welt, Die (2018), *Deutschland steuert auf eine gigantische Personallücke zu*, 7/5/2018, <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article176120863/Korn-Ferry-Fachkraeftemangel-kostet-Deutschland-mehr-als-eine-halbe-Billion.html>
- World Bank (2018), *Data: Germany*, World Bank: Washington, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/Germany>