

# SIB JOINING FORCES

FIRST INTERIM REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF THE SIB  
JOINING FORCES (2019-2021)

INTERIM REPORT

**seo** • economisch onderzoek

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# Summary

Since July 2019, the Ministry of Defence has used an entirely new approach for the reintegration of long-term sick military personnel. With the Social Impact Bond (SIB) 'Joining Forces', the Ministry of Defence aims at long-term reintegration of military personnel with (financial) help from private social investors and private service providers. Through a fund managed by a fund manager, the social investors finance private service providers, who use interventions to help long-term sick military personnel with their reintegration. This includes a focus on the military personnel's work capacity, resilience, self-esteem, motivation, as well as skills to return to work. Clear agreements were made in advance about the results to be achieved by the SIB programme. For example, reintegration services should increase the long-term return to work and well-being of participants, while reducing the number of wage sanctions. If the predetermined goals are met, the Ministry of Defence repays the investors through the fund, with returns. This form of financing is also known as results-based financing (or *pay for success*).


## The research

This report contains the result of the first evaluation of the functioning of the SIB Joining Forces. To this end, both an effect and a process evaluation were conducted in the period between March and December 2021. For the *effect evaluation* of the SIB programme, a theory of change was first established about the functioning of reintegration services. In theory, the SIB helps to remove barriers to reintegration, such as limited job search skills or an overly strong attachment to the Ministry of Defence, which should ultimately have as a result that more participants return to work more quickly and for the longer term. Next, registration and survey data were used to determine the impact of reintegration services, looking, among others, at work resumption, well-being and the extent to which wage sanctions were imposed. For the *process evaluation*, a literature review, interviews, and document analyses were used to gain insight into such aspects as the collaborative process, the division of roles, and the structure and working method of the SIB Joining Forces organisation. This evaluation may be expanded further in follow-up research.

## Effects on work resumption, well-being, and wage sanctions

The interim results suggest that the SIB is effective in achieving its intended objectives. First, the SIB succeeds in getting participants into work more often and more quickly than in the period before the SIB was introduced (see also Figure S.1). It should be noted, however, that the extent to which work is resumed for the longer term was not yet included in the current study because the study period is too short. Second, it is notable that fewer wage sanctions were imposed compared to the period before the SIB was introduced. At the time, the UWV Employee Insurance Agency imposed a wage sanction on the Ministry of Defence in about one in three cases; currently it is for a maximum of 10 per cent of participants. This suggests that compliance with reintegration obligations has also improved since introduction of the SIB. Finally, SIB participants are generally fairly positive about their well-being and health. Especially notable in this regard is the degree to which they feel calm, composed, fit and strong. It has not yet been possible to measure changes in well-being and health over the duration of the programme, as this would require multiple rounds of surveys. This will, however, be possible in follow-up research.

Figure S.1 Cumulative exit of SIB participants after start of SIB



Source: Data File DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO (2021).

Note: Figures from the SIB are based on a Kaplan-Meijer estimate of cumulative duration in the SIB. This is about the *effects* of the SIB. A distinction was made between successful exit and unsuccessful exit. Successful exit is exit to one's former position, a position elsewhere within the Ministry of Defence, or a job with another employer. Unsuccessful exit is leaving the programme for all other reasons, such as moving on to benefits under the Fully Disabled Persons Income Scheme (IVA), resignation at own request, superannuation, and death.

## Organisation of the SIB Joining Forces

There is close cooperation between the Ministry of Defence, the service providers and the fund manager on implementation of the SIB. This collaboration is structured around formally established and frequent consultations at operational, tactical and strategic levels. Additional dashboard consultations are held in which the results of the SIB are discussed, ensuring joint knowledge development. In addition to the formal consultations, many (bilateral) informal consultations take place between the various parties. This collaborative process is generally perceived by the parties as positive, with commonality of objectives, ownership in decision-making, short lines of communication and open communication being cited as strengths.

Nonetheless, a number of concerns have emerged from the study. For example, parties have to invest a great deal of time in consultation and coordination, which - especially for small service providers - can come at the expense of focusing on the SIB programme itself. Conversely, according to a number of parties, more time should be made for further substantive coordination between the various interventions. It would be better for participants if they feel they are following a single track, which is currently not always the case. Finally, there are a number of concerns regarding the result-oriented management. This could be resolved by building in more *checks and balances* in determining the results, and by paying more attention to more unfavourable cases, which it is said are currently returned to the Ministry's case managers more often than cases from the SIB.

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# 1 Introduction

Based on survey and registration data, this study addresses the impact of the Social Impact Bond (SIB) Joining Forces with respect to return to work, the frequency of wage sanctions, and the well-being of long-term sick military personnel. In addition, a process evaluation was conducted that provides insight into the organisation and functioning of the SIB.

## 1.1 Rationale

Working as a member of the military for the Ministry of Defence comes with a relatively heavy physical load compared to many other occupations. In addition, there is a relatively heavy mental burden in the work as a regular soldier, for example, due to the great responsibility of the work and participation in combat in crisis situations. The combined high physical and mental strain is one reason why long-term absence due to illness among military personnel is higher than in many other sectors.

As an employer, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for the reintegration of long-term sick employees. Initially, the reintegration of a sick employee is aimed at returning to the old position. If that is not possible, emphasis shifts to return to another position within the Ministry of Defence organisation (first track) or outside the Ministry (second track). Especially in the second year of illness, there is a lot of focus on reintegration outside the Ministry of Defence. If the Ministry of Defence, as an employer, does not provide sufficient support for the reintegration of sick employees, the UWV Employee Insurance Agency may decide to extend the obligation to continue paying wages for two years. This provides an incentive to ensure a successful reintegration approach for long-term sick military personnel.

In practice, it proved challenging to lead long-term sick military personnel back to work, despite efforts by DCR (Reintegration Services Centre). To improve the reintegration process, DCR has engaged several parties in the past, using different approaches and incentives to increase the proportion of successful reintegration processes. In practice, however, the return on reintegration has fallen short of expectations.

## SIB Joining Forces

Determined to structurally improve the return to work of long-term sick military personnel, the Ministry of Defence adopted a completely new approach in July 2019. With the Social Impact Bond (SIB) 'Joining Forces', the Ministry of Defence aims at long-term reintegration of military personnel with (financial) help from private social investors and private service providers. In doing so, the person reintegrating goes through a combination of interventions, paying attention to work capacity, resilience, self-esteem, motivation, as well as skills to return to work.

The implementation of the interventions is arranged by Robidus, Social Enterprise Reveal (from now on: Reveal) and the Life Goals Foundation (from now on: Life Goals). The SIB is managed by fund manager IncluSIF. Funding of the interventions is vested in external parties, with the reintegration outcome being decisive for the return on investment. The strength of this lies in the common interest of all parties and the input of expertise from market participants regarding reintegration and returns. Finally, the SIB has a learning character, with continuous evaluation of both the

intervention offered and the cooperation between the various parties throughout its term. This pilot runs for eight years, with participants being followed for four years, also when they start working for an external employer.

The broad objective of Joining Forces is to return as many long-term sick military personnel as possible to work in the foreseeable future, where they can satisfactorily earn an independent income for the longer term. More specific objectives of the SIB are to increase long-term work resumption of long-term sick military personnel compared to recent years, to increase the well-being of long-term sick military personnel through reintegration services, and to reduce the number of wage sanctions. Additional goals of the SIB are to innovate the (organisation of) reintegration services for long-term sick workers and to learn from these innovations. Achieving optimal returns for investors is not an explicit goal, but is a logical consequence of achieving the SIB's primary objectives.

## 1.2 Research Questions

The fund manager of the SIB Joining Forces asked SEO Economic Research to conduct independent research into the added value of the interventions and the organisation of the SIB itself. The central research question is:

*'What is the effect of the new intervention combination in the Social Impact Bond 'Joining Forces' on (long-term) redeployment (successful exit from reintegration services) and on the well-being of long-term sick military personnel who cannot be placed in the first track initially, and how can this effectiveness be improved further?'*

Related research questions are:

1. What is the added value of the interventions in terms of finding and maintaining long-term employment and the well-being of the person reintegrating?
2. What is the secondary effect on the frequency of wage sanctions imposed on the Ministry of Defence?
3. What are the factors that influence these effects, both with respect to the effect of the interventions themselves, and with respect to the functioning of the SIB, including the collaboration between the various parties? What can be learned from this in terms of a possible improvement of the approach within the SIB?

## 1.3 Research Approach

To answer the research questions, the following research steps were completed between March and December 2021:

- Step 1: formulating the theory of change
- Step 2: conducting effect evaluation of reintegration services
- Step 3: conducting a survey among participants
- Step 4: process evaluation through interviews and document analysis

### Step 1: formulating the theory of change

In the first research step, a theory of change was established about the functioning of reintegration services within the SIB. To this end, a literature review and document analyses were conducted. The theory of change describes the changes participants go through as a result of participating in the interventions and how these changes contribute to the intended outcomes. This includes, for example, removing barriers that hinder reintegration, imparting knowledge and skills, changing attitudes towards reintegration and work, and confidence in one's own abilities. The theory of change was then tested and supplemented based on interviews with various parties within the SIB



consortium. The research team interviewed parties including service providers (Reveal, Robidus, and Life Goals), the Ministry of Defence (DCR and individual case managers), and the fund manager (IncluSIF). This served to obtain an initial picture of how the SIB functions.

## Step 2: conducting effect evaluation of reintegration services

In the second research step, an initial global effect evaluation of the SIB was conducted. The main focus was on frequency of placement (do participants exit the programme more often?), duration of placement (do participants exit the programme sooner?) and the frequency of wage sanctions (does the Ministry receive wage sanctions less often?). For this purpose, administration data from the Ministry of Defence were used, covering the period from July 2019 (start of SIB) up to and including July 2021. Participants were thus followed for up to 2 years after entering the SIB. This period is too short to determine the long-term effect of placement (do participants exit the programme for the longer term?). The long-term effect of placement can be determined at a later stage.

Strictly speaking, this does not concern an effect evaluation in the classical sense. After all, there is no comparable control group against which to compare the experiences and outcomes for long-term sick military personnel in the SIB (the treatment group). It is possible, however, to compare the results from before the SIB (2014-2017) with the results after the SIB was introduced (from 2019). Ideally, the comparison should take into account differences in economic conditions and the composition of the participant base between the two periods. This could possibly be done in follow-up research using the prediction model developed by SEO in 2018 for the probability of exit from long-term sick leave.<sup>1</sup> By comparing the outcome of the prediction model with the actual exit, differences could be attributed to implementation of the SIB.

## Step 3: conducting a survey among participants

In the third research step, an online survey was conducted among SIB participants to test participants' well-being. The survey was administered between October 13 and October 28 to all 285 participants who were actively supervised within the SIB at that time. A total of 67 participants (24 per cent of the total) completed the survey. The survey results provide insight into the extent to which the SIB contributes to the well-being of participants. By administering the survey at multiple points in the programme, it is possible to measure changes in well-being over time. This will reveal whether well-being changes during participation in the SIB programme. It is also possible to link the survey data to the Ministry of Defence administrative data (see Step 2) to further examine the relationship between well-being and participation in the SIB programme. At this time, this relationship cannot be examined yet because the survey has only been administered once, so changes over time on key outcome measures cannot yet be measured.

## Step 4: process evaluation through interviews and document analysis

In the fourth research step, the organisation of the SIB was mapped through a process evaluation. This process evaluation was based on (i) a literature review, (ii) stakeholder interviews and (iii) a document analysis. The literature review focused on identifying critical factors for successful governance. In doing so, the SIB was viewed primarily based on the literature on collaborative governance. This involves research on forms of governance that consist of (semi-)public and private stakeholders who jointly participate in consensus-oriented decision-making. Based on the literature review, a framework was created with indicators of the critical conditions for successful collaboration (e.g., structure and working method and leadership) and factors critical to the collaboration process itself (e.g., mutual

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<sup>1</sup> Based on this model, a prediction can be made of the duration to exit within the SIB, given the current composition of the SIB participant base and the current business cycle.

trust). Next, the governance of the SIB was empirically tested against this framework by using stakeholder views and document analysis. To this end, interviews were conducted with stakeholders to identify their views on the governance of the SIB, and documents were studied.

## 1.4 Document Structure

The report contains the main findings of the study of effects of the SIB Joining Forces in 2021. Chapter 2 presents the theory of change for the effect of the interventions. Next, Section 3 presents the results of the first effect evaluation, focusing on frequency of and duration until placement, frequency of wage sanctions, and participant well-being. Finally, Chapter 4 maps out the organisation and governance of the SIB.



## 2 Theory of Change

The SIB programme offers participants a vitality programme, coaching, assessments, a place & train workplace and job coaching. Each of these in its own way theoretically contributes to the removal of barriers to reintegration, such as limited job interview skills or an overly strong attachment to the Ministry of Defence. This would allow the SIB to place participants more often, more quickly and for the longer term.

A theory of change is a set of assumptions underlying an intervention. The theory of change can be seen as a chain of results, distinguishing between *input* (human and material resources), *throughput* (activities), *output* (reach and direct results), *outcome* (changes in the target group reached) and *impact* (changes in the system). This chapter describes the theory of change of the SIB Joining Forces.

### 2.1 SIB Joining Forces Theory of Change

Figure 2.1 provides a schematic overview of the functioning of the SIB Joining Forces, drawn up on the basis of the available literature and interviews with stakeholders. The arrows between the parts indicate how the parts are connected and the cause-and-effect relationships. Contextual factors, such as the business cycle and unemployment, play a role in the extent to which SIB activities translate into outputs and outcomes for the success of reintegration. In addition, individual factors may also play a role in reintegration, over which the SIB has no (or only partial) control, such as participants' gender, age, discrimination, and, in part, health and education levels. The individual components of the theory of change - inputs, activities, outcomes and impacts - are explained in more detail below.

#### Input

The inputs consist of the deployment of human, material and qualitative resources that form the basis for implementing the interventions. In the case of the SIB, this mainly involves the knowledge, experience and personnel of the various parties, such as IncluSIF, Reveal, Life Goals, Robidus and the Ministry of Defence. In addition, the interventions take place at 8 different Ministry of Defence locations. The SIB is funded by means of a Social Impact Bond (SIB). This means that external investors initially fund the services within the SIB. The total investment involved is €16.7 million. Only when participants generally exit the programme more successfully than before do investors receive their investment back, with returns (*pay for success*). Other inputs are more qualitative in nature and consist of the network of parties in the SIB, the various partnerships and the (joint) vision and cooperation between the parties.

#### Activities

The reintegration programme offered by the SIB Joining Forces consists of a number of components, including a vitality programme, coaching and assessments. Participants basically go through<sup>2</sup> the following process:

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<sup>2</sup> Not every participant needs to complete all steps of the reintegration programme or necessarily in this order. Limited customisation is possible when this benefits achieving the goals of the SIB.

1. *Warm transfer* Employees does not immediately enter the SIB when they are ill. They are first supervised within their own unit at the Ministry of Defence. If there is a high probability that someone cannot return to their own position, the employee is reported to the Reintegration Service Centre (DCR) and, as a result, to the SIB. This is usually after about 9 months of illness. There is then a 'warm transfer' of the person reintegrating from the Ministry case manager to the coach at Reveal. During the intake interview, the role of the SIB, the role of the case manager and the role of the SIB parties are explained, and agreements are made about reintegration. These agreements are recorded and serve as a guideline for the SIB process.
2. *Vitality Programme* After the intake, participants immediately start with the Life Goals vitality programme, also called the warm-up, which typically lasts 12 weeks. The first part of the programme consists of training in the field. There, insight is gained into behaviours, patterns, ways of communicating, and guarding boundaries. For example, a participant must literally walk up to a wall with the instruction to decide for themselves when to stop, or do push-ups until they decide to stop on their own. The second part of the programme includes a workshop aimed at improving skills that are useful to reintegration. This starts with self-insight: What issues do I encounter? What is holding me back? What do I need to function outside of the Ministry of Defence? It then offers practical tips on building a rhythm, goal setting, sense of purpose and discovering motivations.
3. *Assessment and coaching* Approximately 4 to 6 weeks after the intake, Reveal starts a coaching and counselling programme. The coach helps the participant to remove barriers to reintegration and provide direction for reintegration. For example, the participant goes through an assessment, which produces a unique profile of cognitive abilities, personality traits and skills. The coach subsequently links the profile to an appropriate sector: healthcare, logistics, engineering, security or retail and trade. The assessment forms the basis for the participant's labour market orientation and discussions with their coach.
4. *Matching Centre* A talent consultant assists in matching the participant with potential employers. To this end, a business network of some 120 companies has been built up. The talent consultant provides orientation to the job market and assists in matching the participant. A matching centre has been set up for this purpose. Reveal's programme continues until the participant is placed.
5. *Job coaching* The participant is first placed with an employer and then helped to reintegrate there (*first place, then train*). The person reintegrating still remains under contract with the Ministry of Defence, but is seconded to another employer. Reveal's job coach draws up the secondment agreement (of usually one year) and organises about ten contact moments with the participant during the secondment. In addition, the job coach works with the employer to look at what a participant needs on the job to build a future in the field. Counselling and coaching continue until the end of the programme.

Figure 2.1 SIB Joining Forces Theory of Change





Figure 2.2 shows the default timeline of the programme. There is, however, room for flexibility within the programme. For example, a participant may be taken to the matching centre at the very beginning of the coaching programme to create awareness about job opportunities and possibilities. In addition, not all participants take part in all interventions. An occupational physician, mental health professional or case manager may decide that the intervention is not appropriate for the person reintegrating. Also, in some cases, a participant cannot be motivated to get on board with the programme. Reveil then makes a number of attempts (2 or 3) to still motivate the soldier in face-to-face conversations. If this is not successful, it is reported to the case manager. The case manager may then decide to issue a sanction and/or remove the participant from the SIB.

Figure 2.2 Standard programme timeline



Source: SEO (2021) based on information from interviews

## Output

The outputs of the SIB are the direct outcomes of the activities. These are changes that occur as a direct result of the interventions. These mainly include the removal of barriers to reintegration. Potential barriers include mental and emotional health, limited fitness, limited understanding of one's own talents and abilities, and limited job application skills. Figure 2.3 schematically depicts the theoretical relationships between barriers, interventions, and outputs.<sup>3</sup>

The relationships are detailed below:

- *The vitality programme* focuses on improving the fitness and health of military personnel. It is about health in the broad sense of the word, taking Machteld Huber's health pillars as a starting point: bodily functions, participation, daily functioning, mental well-being, quality of life and sense of purpose. The direct result of the programme is greater self-esteem and increased energy/vitality (primary effect). The activities also increase self-insight and awareness of one's own responsibility to reintegrate (internal locus of control). This will make the participant receptive to new opportunities (including outside the Ministry of Defence) and have them put more effort into reintegration (secondary effect).
- *The coaching* should help remove barriers to reintegration. A significant proportion of participants who start the SIB programme feel anger, disappointment, irritation and/or other sentiments. One reason for this may

<sup>3</sup> Physical health and the lack of knowledge outside the relevant knowledge for the Ministry of Defence may also be barriers. The SIB's interventions do not provide a direct solution for this.

be that their dream of being a well-functioning regular soldier has been shattered, but often it is also because of a difficult relationship with the employer. As a result, they benefit greatly from an outside coach with whom they do not have an employment relationship and who offers neutrality. The coach offers social support, takes away irritations and helps with processing disappointments, so that a person can become fit for work again and get motivated to get back to work. In addition, the coach helps discover motivations and gain insight into the participant's own goals, dreams, and strengths and weaknesses (primary effects). This ultimately causes the person integrating to look for work in a more focused way (secondary effect).

- *Assessments and counselling* further assist in gaining self-insight and provide a first step in job orientation. The unique profile that emerges from the assessment - cognitive abilities, personality traits and skills - is used to identify industries that fit the participant. This also creates knowledge of job opportunities and an awareness that it is possible to get to work in those sectors (primary effect).
- *The matching centre* helps participants - through its business network, matching and (job interview) training - to find a place in the labour market. By providing a clear route to work, the mindset changes and the participant becomes more active in reintegration.
- *Job coach* Once a place has been found in the labour market, a job coach further accompanies the person reintegrating in learning and developing in the workplace (*place & train*). The threshold for an employer to help a person reintegrating find work is lower because they initially remain on the Ministry of Defence payroll. In addition, persons reintegrating are often strongly attached to the Ministry of Defence and therefore fearful of not being able to return to the Ministry of Defence. The secondment agreement provides a safety net, which lowers the barrier to reintegration outside of the Ministry of Defence.<sup>4</sup>

Ultimately, the interventions have an impact on participants' *willingness* and *ability to* reintegrate. Willingness and ability should translate into effort, where a distinction can be made between (i) the quality of effort (does it happen in the right way?); and (ii) the intensity of effort (does it happen enough?). Together, this leads to actual reintegration efforts that, depending on external factors, can lead to getting closer to the goals of the SIB, including achieving long-term placement and return to work.

## Outcome

The outcome reflects whether the results of the SIB reintegration programme have led to the achievement of the intended overall objectives of the SIB (and thus concerns the effectiveness of the interventions). In the case of the SIB Joining Forces, the objectives consist of:


1. Accelerating and increasing the placement of sick military personnel for the longer term;
2. Increasing the well-being of long-term sick military personnel;
3. Reducing wage sanctions and extending the obligation to continue to pay wages less frequently.

The ways in which the SIB theoretically contributes to achieving these outcomes are detailed below.

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<sup>4</sup> That formal affiliation with the Ministry of Defence may also get in the way of a true transition to another employer.

Figure 2.3 Output of SIB Joining Forces interventions.



#### *Accelerating and increasing the placement of sick military personnel for the longer term*

The SIB aims to accelerate the reintegration of participants. An intensive and personalised programme motivates and activates participants to get to work sooner. This is also evident from previous research.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the very intensity of the programme may cause participants to have less time to look for work, reducing their availability to the labour market - the so-called lock-in effect.<sup>6</sup> However, that lock-in effect is limited among people with a high probability of long-term unemployment, such as long-term sick military personnel.<sup>7</sup> As a result, the intensive programme is expected to provide faster reintegration (and lower benefit dependency) than without it, also when compared to reintegration programmes previously applied to long-term sick military personnel.

In addition to faster reintegration, the SIB Joining Forces also seek reintegration for longer periods than was the case in the past. This takes the form of the type of contract someone receives (longer than 6 months, no on-call or temporary contract) and the prevention of a return to drawing sickness benefits. To achieve this, the programme pays a lot of attention to discovering one's own possibilities and qualities and to the quality of the placement (through job coaching and a diverse network of companies). As a result, the participant is more likely to find appropriate and suitable work. This increases workplace productivity and employee satisfaction, which motivates them to continue working and advance to a substantial job. This may make reintegration more long-term in nature.

<sup>5</sup> See, among others, Heyma & Van der Werff (2014) and Koning, Hek, Malle, Groenwoud, & Zwinkels (2015).

<sup>6</sup> See, among others, Caliendo & Schimdl (2016) and Card, Kluve, & Weber (2010).

<sup>7</sup> After all, they would have limited availability for the labour market even without participation in the programme.

*Enhancing the well-being of long-term sick military personnel*

The programme pays close attention to the participant's health, personal situation and motivations. Together with the personalised and dedicated supervision, this can have positive effects on the participant's well-being. However, the participant themselves must also make an effort and the benefit situation is less non-committal. This can be a deterrent and actually worsen the participant's well-being (in the short term). An additional disadvantage of this deterrent effect is that long-term sick military personnel are less likely to enter the SIB and are more likely to choose to return to work at the Ministry of Defence or to be discharged at their own request, which may reduce the entry into the SIB. This has consequences for the composition of the group of military personnel entering the SIB (selective<sup>8</sup>) and for the financing and profitability of the SIB (fewer participants and therefore proportionally higher fixed costs).

*Reducing wage sanctions and extending the obligation to continue to pay wages less frequently*

The SIB is also expected to help reduce the number of wage sanctions. Employers receive these wage sanctions if they fail to comply adequately with the reintegration obligations under the Eligibility for Permanent Incapacity Benefit (Restrictions) Act (*Wet Poortwachter*). In that case employers must extend the period of continued payment of wages, which comes with additional costs. To avoid sanctions, the Ministry of Defence must complete a number of steps during the period of continued payment of wages, such as conducting a problem analysis and drawing up an action plan and a reintegration report. In the past, these steps were often not completed or not properly administered. As a result, the Ministry of Defence was issued wage sanctions in about one in three of its long-term sick military personnel. Within the SIB, Robidus is primarily concerned with preventing and reducing wage sanctions and supporting case managers in meeting formal reintegration obligations. To this end, Robidus periodically conducts file analyses on which feedback is provided to the Ministry case managers. This provides an additional check on both compliance with the legal requirements of the Eligibility for Permanent Incapacity Benefit (Restrictions) Act and the taking of substantive steps within the reintegration processes. This theoretically decreases the frequency of wage sanctions.

## Impact

The impact of the interventions at the societal level is threefold. Firstly, SIB interventions can provide increased labour participation for (former) military personnel who have been ill for long periods of time. This is not only limited to a quicker return to work. The SIB is also committed to keeping participants in work for the longer term. Secondly, the SIB can contribute to a higher utilisation of society's labour potential. In this regard, efforts to get long-term sick military personnel to work and then advance to substantial employment play a major role. Thirdly, greater and more long-term work resumption can lead to a reduction in social costs of care, crime, benefit costs, poverty and debt. How great this impact is will need to be demonstrated in practice and will therefore need to be accurately determined empirically.

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<sup>8</sup> This does not immediately mean selection at the gate. This is selectivity in statistical terms, where the group entering the SIB for whatever reason has a different composition in terms of background characteristics than the total group of long-term sick military personnel.



### 3 Evaluation of the Effects of SIB Joining Forces

The SIB succeeds in achieving its goals: it succeeds in placing participants more often and more quickly than before. There were also fewer wage sanctions imposed by the UWV Employee Insurance Agency than before. Finally, participants are generally fairly positive about their well-being and health.

An effect evaluation shows whether the SIB is having the desired effect. The potential effects are in line with the stated objectives of the SIB (which are described in the theory of change):

1. Accelerating and increasing the placement of long term sick military personnel for the longer term;
2. Increasing the well-being of long-term sick military personnel;
3. Reducing wage sanctions and extending the obligation to continue to pay wages less frequently.

This interim report focuses on the first and third objectives, in the absence of information on the change in well-being among SIB participants. The main focus was on frequency of placement (do participants exit the programme more often?), duration of placement (do participants exit the programme sooner?) and the frequency of wage sanctions (do participants receive wage sanctions less often?). The necessary survey and registration data to determine the long-term effect of placement and the well-being of military personnel are not available yet. When these data have been collected at multiple times, effects can be inferred.

The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1. contains an overview of the composition of the SIB's participant base. Section 3.2 examines the frequency of placement, including characteristics associated with a higher likelihood of placement. Section 3.3 then discusses the duration until placement. Next, Section 3.4 discusses the frequency of wage sanctions and Section 3.5 describes the well-being of participants based on an initial measurement. Finally, Section 3.6 describes preliminary conclusions and opportunities for future research.

#### 3.1 Composition of participant base

A data file was provided by the Ministry of Defence containing military personnel on long-term sick leave who have been assisted by the SIB for their reintegration. Table 3.1 shows the composition of the participant base. This includes only cases that completed an intake and whose possible discharge date was<sup>9</sup> after the start date of counselling by the SIB.<sup>10</sup> Due to a limited number of observations, some Ministry units have been merged. Specifically, these are the units Executive Staff (BS), Ministry of Defence Materials and Organisation (DMO), and Ministry of Defence Supporting Command (DOSCO), which are placed under the broader category of staff positions.

A total of 450 participants were included in the analyses. Of these, 281 participants entered the SIB between July 2019 and July 2020 (cohort 1) and 169 participants between July 2020 and July 2021 (cohort 2). A number of differences can be observed between the two cohorts in the composition of the participant base. For example,

<sup>9</sup> Discharge date here represents the date that military personnel cease to be absent due to illness (discharge as a DCR customer). So it has nothing to do with dismissal from the job.

<sup>10</sup> In total, registration data are available from 527 participants. Of those, 74 did not complete an intake. For 8 individuals, the discharge date was after the start date of counselling by the SIB. This is presumably a registration error. Due to the small number, it was decided not to include these observations, as they may have a significant impact on the results.

participants from cohort 1 tend to be slightly older when they enter the SIB: average age of 31.1 compared to 28.5 for cohort 2. It is also notable that participants from cohort 1 enter the SIB slightly earlier. Whereas participants from cohort 2 enter on average after nearly 10 months of illness, participants from cohort 1 enter on average after nearly 9 months of illness. According to previous research by SEO (2018), both age and the length of time until the start of counselling determine the likelihood of successfully exiting SIB. It is therefore important to take these differences into account when determining the effectiveness of SIB within and between different cohorts.

Table 3.1 Composition of participant base


Theme	Category	Cohort 1: July 2019 - July 2020		Cohort 2: July 2020 - July 2021		Cohort 1 & 2: July 2019 - July 2021	
		Share	Number	Share	Number	Share	Number
Age at start of SIB	18-24	33%	93	39%	66	35%	159
	25-34	38%	107	43%	73	40%	180
	35-44	16%	46	14%	23	15%	69
	45-54	9%	24	3%	5	6%	29
	55 and up	3%	8	1%	1	2%	9
	unknown	1%	3	1%	1	1%	4
	Total	100%	281	100%	169	100%	450
Ministry of Defence unit	Staff	2%	5	1%	1	1%	6
	Royal Marechaussee	11%	30	11%	18	11%	48
	Army	56%	158	60%	102	58%	260
	Air Force	12%	33	8%	13	10%	46
	Navy	20%	55	21%	35	20%	90
Duration of illness until start of SIB	0-0.5 years	14%	39	11%	18	13%	57
	0.5-1 years	74%	208	64%	108	70%	316
	1-1.5 years	9%	25	24%	41	15%	66
	1.5-2 years	1%	3	1%	1	1%	4
	unknown <sup>a</sup>	2%	6	1%	1	2%	7
Participation in interventions	Life Goals	70%	197	50%	85	63%	282
	Jump Movement	44%	123	40%	68	42%	191
	Reveal	70%	198	73%	123	71%	321
	Place & Train	20%	55	20%	33	20%	88
	No intervention	21%	58	18%	30	20%	88

Source: Database DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO Economic Research (2021)

<sup>a</sup> For some participants (3 participants), the first day of illness is after the date of entering the SIB. For others (2 participants), there is more than 2 years and 4 months between the first day of illness and date of entering the SIB. One possible explanation is that recording errors were made or two absence periods were linked together. Hence, the entry point for these participants is unknown.

SIB participants do not participate equally in all interventions. The majority of participants took part in Reveal's assessment and Life Goals' vitality programme. Figure 3.1 shows that participants start these interventions relatively early in the programme. Within 100 days of entering the SIB, 53 per cent of the participants took part in the vitality programme and 50 per cent in the Reveal assessment. This is in line with the design of the SIB programme, in which participants start with the vitality programme to become fit for work, receive an assessment to determine their labour market position and opportunities, and only then take the step towards the labour market. Also in line with this is that the entry into the Place- & Train pathway occurs later in the programme. A limited proportion of participants also took part in Jump Movement interventions. This limited participation is partly because the partnership with Jump Movement was discontinued during the course of the SIB.<sup>11</sup>

Figure 3.1 Proportion who participated in interventions after entering SIB



Source: Database DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO Economic Research (2021)

## 3.2 Exiting reintegration processes

One of the goals of the SIB is to successfully transition long-term sick military personnel into work more often. Table 3.2 shows that about three-quarters of SIB participants from cohort 1 exited from the reintegration programme. They exited for a variety of causes. The majority of those who left the programme were successfully placed in their old jobs (59 per cent), elsewhere within the Ministry of Defence (3 per cent first track) or outside the Ministry of Defence (2 per cent second track). In addition, there is a significant group of participants who resign<sup>12</sup> at their own request (14 per cent). It is also noteworthy that for a portion of those leaving the programme the cause is still unknown. Although it is known when they left the programme, the reason for leaving is not yet included in the registration

<sup>11</sup> The same is true of Future Group, with whom cooperation ceased over time.

<sup>12</sup> Again, dismissal indicates termination of the reintegration process, not termination of employment.

data. Of cohort 2, a significantly smaller proportion has currently exited the programme, but this is mainly because they started the SIB a shorter time ago.

Table 3.2 Exit from the SIB

Theme	Category	Cohort year 1: July 2019 - July 2020		Cohort year 2: July 2020 - July 2021		Cohorts 1 and 2: July 2019 - July 2021	
		Share	Number	Share	Number	Share	Number
Exit	No exit from the SIB	25%	71	66%	112	47%	183
	Exit from the SIB	75%	210	34%	57	53%	267
	Total	100%	281	100%	169	100%	450
If exited: cause	Placement/return-to-work	55%	116	72%	41	59%	157
	Placement elsewhere within the Ministry	4%	9	0%	0	3%	9
	Placement outside the Ministry	2%	5	0%	0	2%	5
	Entitled to sickness benefits due to expiration of contract	3%	7	4%	2	3%	9
	Dismissal at own request	14%	30	18%	10	15%	40
	Moving on to IVA benefit	1%	2	0%	0	1%	2
	Other (superannuation, death, punitive dismissal)	5%	10	4%	2	4%	12
	Unknown	15%	31	4%	2	12%	33
	Total	100%	210	100%	57	100%	267

Source: Database DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO Economic Research (2021)

### Who are most likely to exit the programme?

The likelihood of successfully exiting may be related to characteristics of the person reintegrating. Successful exit is defined as returning to one's own position, a job elsewhere within the Ministry of Defence, or a job with another employer. One question is for example whether young people are more likely to exit than older people. This can be examined with a Logit analysis. Such an analysis estimates the probability of exiting within, say, one year of entering the SIB based on a participant's characteristics and is often used for analyses with binary outcome variables. This analysis included participants who started the SIB programme one or more years ago. Participants whose cause of exiting is unknown were omitted from the analysis because it is not possible to determine whether they exited successfully.

Table 3.3 presents the so-called marginal effects of background characteristics of participants on the probability of successfully exiting the SIB within one year of entry. Characteristics with an asterisk have a significant effect. A significant effect means that effects are not equal to zero with some certainty. One asterisk represents significance at 90 per cent certainty, two asterisks represent significance at 95 per cent certainty, and three asterisks represent significance at 99 per cent certainty.<sup>13</sup> For example, it appears that a 1-year increase in age leads to a 4 percentage point reduction in the probability of successful exit, at a 90 per cent certainty level. In other words: young people are more likely to reintegrate than older people. In addition, persons reintegrating assessed as not being at risk of

<sup>13</sup> When an effect is identified with less than 90 per cent certainty (one asterisk), it is considered not significantly different from zero in a statistical sense. De facto no effect is found in that case.

a wage sanction have a 28 per centage point greater chance of successfully exiting within one year (at 90 per cent certainty). This suggests that the quality of the reintegration file is related to the likelihood of successful reintegration.

The duration from the first day of illness to the start of the SIB seems to have a positive effect on successful exit. This seems peculiar, as it would imply that a longer duration until application to the SIB is more likely to lead to successful exit. Here, however, the relationship between cause and effect is not clear. This may, in fact, be due to selection. For example, there may be a group of long-term sick soldiers who are reported early to the SIB because it is already clear that they will not recover quickly. On the other hand, there could be a group of long-term sick soldiers who are actually reported late to the SIB because they are expected to recover quickly. This would imply that there are characteristics that differ between the two groups that are not otherwise included in the model presented here (in this example, the expected probability of recovery). In addition, this could include the motivation to reintegrate or work ability. If those characteristics are related to the duration from the first day of illness to the start of the SIB, the relationship found is not unambiguous and it cannot be concluded that later registration in the SIB leads to a more successful exit. A greater likelihood of successful exit may, therefore, be related to factors that also cause later registration in the SIB. In follow-up research, survey data can be linked to the registration data to also include characteristics such as work ability and motivation to reintegrate in the model. In that case, it is possible to take these determinant characteristics into account and estimate an accurate effect for the duration until entry into the SIB.

**Table 3.3 Predictors of the likelihood of successful exit from SIB Joining Forces**

Theme	Model	Chance of successful exit within one year
Age	Age at SIB registration	-4%**
	Age squared	0%*
Ministry of Defence unit (vs. staff)	Royal Marechaussee	12%
	Army	18%
	Air Force	27%
	Navy	8%
Risk of wage sanction (vs. middle)	No risk of wage sanction	28%*
	Low risk of wage sanction	3%
	High risk of wage sanction	12%
Entry point	Duration of illness until start of SIB	10%**
	Duration of illness until start of SIB squared	-0%**
Entry point to participation	Duration to first intervention within SIB	0%
	Duration to first intervention within SIB squared	-0%
Economic situation	Business cycle (In employed persons/unemployed)	-35%
	Number of observations	264


Source: Data File DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO Economic Research (2021). The models take into account participation in the different interventions. It is also possible in follow-up research to show the effects of this.

Characteristics that do not seem to have any significant influence on successful exit from the SIB are the Ministry of Defence unit where military personnel worked before their long-term illness, the duration until the first intervention within the SIB, and the economic situation.

### 3.3 Duration until exit

This section discusses the duration to exit of SIB participants. The average time to exit from the SIB is about 33 weeks. However, this gives a distorted picture, as the duration has not yet been completed for a portion of the participants. For example, because they have only recently entered the SIB or because they have not exited yet. It is known, however, that the length of time they remain in the SIB is at least longer than until the reference date of the registration data. This information has been used in this section to provide a representative estimate of the duration within the SIB.

Figure 3.2 Cumulative exit of SIB participants after the start of the SIB



Source: Data File DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO (2021).

Note: Figures from the SIB are based on a Kaplan-Meijer estimate of cumulative duration in the SIB.

Figure 3.2 shows the development of exit of military personnel since the day they started at the SIB. This is the estimated duration in the SIB. A distinction was made between successful exit and unsuccessful exit. Successful exit is exit to one's former position, a position elsewhere within the Ministry of Defence, or a job with another employer. Unsuccessful exit is leaving the programme for all other reasons, such as moving on to benefits under the Fully Disabled Persons Income Scheme (*IVA*), resignation at own request, superannuation, and death. It is important to note that the definitions of successful and unsuccessful exit for the purposes of this *effect evaluation* differ from the definitions used for *result measurement* within the SIB itself (see Box 1 for further explanation).

The results from Figure 3.2 show that the proportion of successfully exited participants one year after entering the SIB is about 40 per cent.<sup>14</sup> After two years, about 55 per cent of the total number of participants has exited successfully. An initial comparison with the period 2014-2017 before introduction of the SIB shows that since the SIB, long-term sick military personnel successfully exit to work earlier and more frequently.<sup>15</sup> This can be explained by the efforts of the SIB, but other factors may also play a role. These could include the economic situation, the composition of the participant base and additional policies.

To effectively attribute the outcomes to the use of the SIB, follow-up research would ideally use the prediction model developed by SEO in 2018 for the Ministry of Defence. Based on this model, a prediction can be made of the duration to exit within the SIB, given the current composition of the SIB participant base and the current business cycle. The outcome of the prediction can then be compared with the actual exit figures. Because that comparison takes into account differences in composition and economic conditions between the pre- and post-SIB periods, the change is more attributable to the deployment of reintegration services within the SIB.<sup>16</sup>

#### Box 1 Differences in outcome measurement and effectiveness measurement

The Ministry of Defence's Reintegration Service Centre (DCR) maintains data on results of activities that are part of the SIB. Based on these results, DCR determines whether the activities have resulted in successful *results* among participants. A successful result is achieved when participants have exited to their old job, a job elsewhere within the Ministry of Defence, a job with another employer, or have gone on to receive IVA benefit. This result measurement is used to determine if the predetermined outcome goals are being achieved. After two years, the SIB should achieve a successful result for 35.5 per cent of participants and after four years for 60 per cent of participants. On that basis, the government repays the investors.

This result measurement differs from the effect evaluation in this study. The purpose of the effect evaluation is to identify the extent to which the SIB succeeds in achieving its objectives, such as accelerating and increasing work resumption for the longer term. Therefore, in the effect evaluation, only work resumption (in old job, new job within the Ministry of Defence or outside the Ministry) has been classified as successful, and not moving on to the IVA benefit. In addition, the outcome measurement established the outcome 28 months after the first day of illness, regardless of when someone entered the SIB. However, the effect evaluation looked at exit from the moment someone enters the SIB, as this provides more insight into the effectiveness of the SIB.

An important note is that for some participants there are no records of the exit moment or the cause of exit. For example, for some of the participants (24 participants), the reason for exit is known, but the exit moment is not. For another portion (33 participants), the exit point is known, but the reason for exit is missing, making it impossible to assess whether it is a successful or unsuccessful exit. We leave these participants out of the analyses of exit duration, as this may lead to biased results. The duration analyses were thus conducted for 393 SIB participants.

<sup>14</sup> The median exit from starting in the SIB is just under one year for participants. This is the time when half of the SIB participants exited. At that time, approximately 41 per cent successfully exited and 9 per cent unsuccessfully exited.

<sup>15</sup> This is based on confidential analyses previously conducted by SEO for the Ministry of Defence's Reintegration Service Centre (DCR).

<sup>16</sup> This analysis requires permission from the Ministry of Defence to use the prediction model developed for it for the current study.



### 3.4 Wage sanctions

The UWV Employee Insurance Agency may impose a wage sanction if the reintegration obligations are not sufficiently met. In that case, the Ministry of Defence must continue to pay the wages of the person reintegrating for up to an additional year. The assessment by the UWV will include the timely deployment of activities in the context of the reintegration <sup>1st</sup> track and reintegration <sup>2nd</sup> track (*eerste en tweede spoor*). Before the SIB, the UWV imposed a wage sanction in almost one in three cases, despite efforts by DCR to lead as many military personnel as possible back to work.<sup>17</sup> During the SIB, this proportion is much lower, as shown in Table 3.4. For example, the Ministry of Defence was imposed wage sanctions for 8 per cent of participants in cohort 1 and 2 per cent of participants in cohort 2. However, the UWV usually only imposes a wage sanction once the end of the period of continued payment of wages in the event of illness has been reached and the employee submits an application for benefits under the Work and Income (Capacity for Work) Act (*WIA*). This is done at the end of the period of continued payment of wages (after 2 years of illness). However, the Ministry of Defence received a wage sanction for only 10 per cent of the participants who became ill 2 years ago. This suggests that compliance with reintegration obligations has improved since the introduction of the SIB.

Table 3.4 Wage sanctions in the SIB

Theme	Category	Cohort year 1: July 2019- July 2020		Cohort year 2: July 2020- July 2021		Cohorts 1 and 2: July 2019- July 2021		Cohort: ill for at least 2 years	
		Share	Number	Share	Number	Share	Number	Share	Number
Wage sanctions	No	92%	258	98%	165	94%	423	90%	225
	Yes	8%	23	2%	4	6%	27	10%	25
	Total	100%	281	100%	169	100%	450	100%	253
Risk of wage sanction	No	1%	2	0%	0	0%	2	1%	2
	Low	16%	45	25%	43	20%	88	16%	40
	Middle	35%	99	46%	78	39%	177	36%	91
	High	44%	123	27%	46	38%	169	46%	116
	Unknown	4%	12	1%	2	3%	14	2%	4
	Total	100%	281	100%	169	100%	450	100%	253

Source: Database DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO (2021)

#### Who receives a wage sanction?

The likelihood of the UWV imposing a wage sanction may be related to characteristics of a person who is reintegrating or their job. The question is, for example, whether this is more prevalent in certain Ministry of Defence units than in others. This was examined using what is known as a Logit analysis. Table 3.5 shows the marginal effects of characteristics of imposing a wage sanction. It is notable that the duration until the start of counselling within the SIB is significantly related to the likelihood of a wage sanction. Participants who enter the SIB one month later in their illness period are on average 1 to 2 percentage points more likely to be given a wage sanction. This possibly indicates the positive impact that the SIB has on the quality of reintegration files. At the same time, there may be selectivity. There may be reasons that explain why someone who enters the SIB late is also given a wage sanction. It is

<sup>17</sup> This data is again based on confidential analyses SEO has conducted for DCR in the past.

also noteworthy that almost none of the other characteristics are significantly associated with the imposition of a wage sanction. Even the risk of a wage sanction - as determined on the basis of the reintegration file - is not significantly related to being imposed a wage sanction.

Table 3.5 Predictors of having a wage sanction imposed

Theme	Model - likelihood of wage sanction	All participants	Cohort 1: July 2019- July 2020	Cohort 2: July 2020- July 2021	Within 2 years and 4 months
Age	Age at SIB registration	0%	0%	6%	0%
	Age squared	0%	0%	0%	0%
Ministry of Defence unit (vs. staff)	Royal Marechaussee	-14%	-25%	-	-24%
	Army	-17%	-26%	-	-28%
	Air Force	-12%	-19%	-	-21%
	Navy	-16%	-28%	-	-30%
Risk of wage sanction (vs. middle)	Low risk of wage sanction	-2%	-5%	-	-5%
	High risk of wage sanction	2%	-2%	-	-1%
Entry point	Duration of illness until start of SIB squared	1%***	2%***	1%	2%***
	Observations	428	263	80	246

Source: Database DCR, Ministry of Defence, edited by SEO (2021)


### 3.5 Well-being

Promoting the well-being of sick military personnel during the reintegration process is another focus of the SIB. However, it has not yet been possible to measure well-being over time. This requires multiple rounds of surveys to be able to observe changes over time in *individual* participants. Then it also makes sense to link the survey data to registration data so that the relationship between well-being and participation in the SIB programme can be further examined.

At this point it is possible to show an initial state of affairs regarding the well-being of SIB participants. The questionnaire includes several indicators of well-being, such as the degree to which a person is satisfied with life, feels happy and healthy, and is calm and composed. Figure 3.3 shows how SIB participants rated their well-being in different phases of the reintegration process on a scale of 1 to 5. Overall, on average, participants were neutral to positive about their well-being (an average score of 3 or higher). They are particularly positive about how calm, composed, fit and strong they feel. In contrast, they are somewhat more negative about the degree to which they are satisfied with their lives. Although the differences are small, participants in phase 2 are most negative about their well-being. This is mainly in the areas of satisfaction and how energetic they feel. This may be explained by the fact that participants need to make efforts before they can reap the benefits. The effort-to-benefit ratio is potentially the most negative in phase 2. Incidentally, Figure 3.3 may also conceal a selection of participants in the sense that those with the lowest well-being perceptions at the time of the survey happened to be in phase 2 more frequently. This can be corrected for by taking measurements at different times.


Questions were also included about the extent to which participants felt healthy. This distinguished between physical health, mental health and overall health. The results are shown in Figure 3.4. This shows that participants are generally positive about their health. Compared to physical and mental health, participants do tend to be more negative about their overall health. This is not surprising, since overall health is a sum of both physical and mental aspects. In addition, it is notable that participants in later stages are more positive about their health. This may be a result of participation in the SIB, but may also be due (again) to differences in composition or simply because recovery (particularly physical recovery) generally has an upward trend over time. Follow-up research may reveal the extent to which the increase in health across phases is attributable to the SIB programme.

Figure 3.3 Well-being of SIB participants in different phases of the programme



Source: Survey data, edited by SEO (2021)

Figure 3.4 Participants' perceived health



Source: Survey data, edited by SEO (2021)

## 3.6 Interim conclusion and follow-up research

The interim results provide the necessary indications that the SIB is effective in achieving its intended objectives. Firstly, the SIB succeeds in placing participants more often and more quickly than in the period before the SIB started. It should be noted, however, that the long-term effect of the placement is not yet included in the current study because the study period is too short. Second, it is notable that fewer wage sanctions were imposed compared to the period before the SIB was introduced. At the time, about one in three cases received a wage sanction from UWV; currently this seems to apply to no more than 10 per cent of participants. This suggests that compliance with reintegration obligations has also improved since introduction of the SIB. Finally, SIB participants are generally fairly positive about their well-being and health. Especially notable in this regard is the degree to which they feel calm, composed, fit and strong. It has not yet been possible to measure changes in well-being and health over the duration of the programme, as this would require multiple rounds of surveys.

### Follow-up research

This first evaluation of the SIB Joining Forces gives a relatively positive picture of the effects and thus possible effectiveness. At the same time, little is known about the mechanisms within the SIB programme that could explain these effects. Follow-up research should reveal whether more can be said about the mechanisms. Conducting multiple rounds of surveys and linking these data to the registration data not only allows for a more accurate estimation of the effects, but also provides empirical findings to support the plausibility of the relationships from the theory of change. This will reveal the changes that are mainly taking place among participants in the SIB programme (such as development of job application knowledge, self-confidence, etc.). This provides further insight into how the SIB programme actually works. Subsequently, it is also possible to map how the changes among participants are related to the participant's success (e.g., faster placement). This provides insight into the important elements of the SIB programme and provides tools to implement results-oriented management.

In addition, research over a longer period of time can identify the long-term effects of the SIB on return to work. The results in this report concern a period of up to 2 years after entering the SIB. Follow-up research will allow SIB participants to be followed over a longer period of time, which will provide more information on the extent to which participants return to unemployment. This also provides opportunities to identify which specific interventions (such as those of Reveal and Life Goals) contribute to long-term work resumption.<sup>18</sup> It is also possible to gain more information about the quality of the placement and the extent to which participants move on to substantial employment. For the latter, registration data on the type of contract (permanent, temporary, agency, etc.) and length of contract (longer or shorter than 6 months), and survey data on social integration and satisfaction at the workplace can be linked.

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<sup>18</sup> Currently, the time frame over which data was collected (maximum 2 years) is too short. For example, when looking at the probability of exiting within 1 year of the SIB, it is evident that participation in, for example, the place&train programme has a negative impact on the probability of exit. After all, the place&train programme typically takes place late in the programme, which means that participants by definition have a lower probability of exiting within one year.

## 4 Process Evaluation

Overall, the SIB is functioning well. In terms of collaboration, structure and working methods, leadership and results, a format has been found about which stakeholders are predominantly positive. This does not detract from the fact that there are a number of areas of concern, including consultation structure, knowledge development, and result-oriented management.

In addition to the effect of the interventions themselves, the organisation and cooperation between parties are critical to the success of the SIB Joining Forces. This chapter takes a closer look at the organisation of the SIB by means of a process evaluation. For this purpose, a description of the organisation of the SIB and the division of roles between the different parties is first provided (see Section 4.1). It then goes on to detail the collaborative process, structure and working method, leadership, and direction of the SIB (see Sections 4.2-4.5). In doing so, we start with the theory (based on the literature review) to then describe the practice in the SIB (based on interviews and documentation). A number of concerns emerged from the evaluation, based on which a number of opportunities for improvements to the SIB are outlined (Section 4.6).

### 4.1 Organisation of the Social Impact Bond

A Social Impact Bond (SIB) is a funding instrument with which the government (through an intermediary or fund manager) contracts private investors to solve social issues. In the case of the SIB Joining Forces, it involves the reintegration of long-term sick military personnel. Investors fund service providers who use interventions to try to solve an issue. Clear agreements are made in advance about the objectives and the results to be achieved for the central target group. After two years, the SIB should achieve a successful outcome for 35.5 per cent of participants and after four years for 60 per cent of participants. If the results are not satisfactory, the investors lose their money. This form of financing is also known as results-based financing (or *pay for success*).

A SIB combines three developments within the public sector: contracting for services, attracting and leveraging private capital, and paying for results. A SIB - according to proponents - can overcome dysfunctional elements of government by delivering more efficient and innovative services.<sup>19</sup> This creates a win-win situation for the public sector: without results, no public money is spent, but with results, other costs are avoided (such as benefit costs), resulting in net gains.


### Organisation of the SIB Joining Forces

Figure 4.1 schematically depicts the theoretical functioning of the SIB Joining Forces. Stakeholders are investors, the fund manager, reintegration service providers, persons reintegrating and the Ministry of Defence. The following is a brief description of the roles of the various stakeholders:

<sup>19</sup> See Liebman & Sellman (2013) and Dear, et al. (2016).

- *Investors*  
Investors in the SIB are Aegon, European Investment Fund, Fundatie van den Santheuvel, Sobbe and Fonds DBL. A total of €16.7 million was invested. The conditions under which investors recover their investments (including returns) are clearly agreed in advance. For example, 60 per cent of participants must reintegrate for the longer term, wage sanctions must be reduced and at the same time a higher level of well-being among participants must be achieved. The investors are involved in the SIB through the *advisory board*, in which IncluSIF keeps the investors informed of developments within the SIB. The advisory board has no decision-making power in the implementation of the SIB, but it does co-decide on (revisions of) contracts and performance agreements.
- *Fund Manager*  
The IncluSIF fund manager is responsible for attracting and managing private investment and mediating between the various parties. In doing so, IncluSIF is responsible for structuring and coordinating the SIB and managing the risks for investors. In managing the service providers, IncluSIF uses Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which are linked to the goals of the SIB.
- *Service providers*  
The service providers Reveal and Life Goals provide the interventions in which the persons reintegrating participate. For this, they receive working capital from IncluSIF. In addition, service provider Robidus has joined to assist with the legal and administrative tasks required to comply with the Eligibility for Permanent Incapacity Benefit (Restrictions) Act (*Wet Poortwachter*). Finally, Ministry of Defence personnel (such as case managers and reintegration counsellors) support participants. Case managers, for instance, continue to work on reintegration at the Ministry of Defence (including<sup>1st</sup> track) throughout the SIB.
- *Reintegrating military personnel*  
The SIB's target group consists of long-term sick military personnel who are usually unable to return to work in their own positions. Ministry of Defence case managers transfer them to the SIB after an average of 9 months of illness, after which they receive services under the SIB. However, case managers do retain the authority to determine which persons reintegrating enter the SIB, in which interventions they participate, and whether they continue in the programme. This is done in consultation with the SIB parties.
- *Evaluator*  
The Ministry of Defence's Reintegration Service Centre (DCR) determines SIB outcomes based on registration data collected by SIB case managers and process supervisors. The way in which the result is determined is agreed in advance. In addition, DCR provides a dashboard on the results of the SIB, so that it is better able to manage for results. Finally, SEO maps the effectiveness of service provision in terms of (long-term) resumption of work, improvement of well-being and reduction of wage sanctions as a result of the SIB. Together, this should provide an accurate measurement of the SIB's outcome.
- *Ministry of Defence*  
On the one hand, the Ministry of Defence is involved in the content of the SIB by providing personnel to integrate by going through the SIB process, by calculating the results, and by being closely involved in the direction and coordination of the SIB. On the other hand, the Ministry repays the private investors based on the results of the SIB (*outcome payer*). If the agreed results are not achieved, the Ministry does not have to repay the investors. The financial risk therefore largely lies with the investors.

Figure 4.1 Functioning of SIB Joining Forces



## Governance of the SIB

The way the parties work together can be characterised as *collaborative governance*. Collaborative governance is defined as a governance approach in which private and (semi-) public stakeholders work together on consensus-based decision-making.<sup>20</sup> Stakeholders are thus directly involved in the decision-making process and do not merely have an executive or consultative role. Collaborative governance suits a context of *wicked problems* and interdependence. These are complex problems that cut across multiple domains and where no single stakeholder has all the knowledge, information and power needed to solve the problem.<sup>21</sup> In addition, it is important that stakeholders see added value in the collaboration and are willing to cooperate.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the emphasis is also on studying collaboration, which includes aspects such as creating shared goals, mutual trust, and shared rules for collaboration. From this perspective, then, the organisation is a social system in which decision-making is complex because a large number of stakeholders must work together while having different and sometimes conflicting interests (both at the organisational and individual levels).<sup>23</sup>

The success of collaborative governance theoretically depends on a number of factors, which in this study are divided into three categories: structure and working method, the collaborative process, and leadership. Figure 4.1

<sup>20</sup> See Ansell & Gash (2007)

<sup>21</sup> See Kooiman (1993)

<sup>22</sup> See Mandell (2010)

<sup>23</sup> See Eriksson, Andersson, Hellstrom, Gadolin, & Lifvergren (2019).



shows how the categories relate to each other. This shows that the structure and working method and leadership (through the fund manager and the Ministry of Defence) all influence the process of collaboration. The collaboration process ultimately determines the outcomes of the SIB. This process is iterative and non-linear and therefore presented (highly simplified) as a cycle. The remainder of this chapter discusses the various categories in more detail. In doing so, we start with the theory (based on the literature review) to then describe the practice in the SIB (based on interviews and documentation).

## 4.2 Collaborative process

### Consultation and mutual trust

*Theory* In an effective collaboration, there is a (digital) face-to-face dialogue between stakeholders. This direct form of dialogue is necessary to identify opportunities for mutual benefit, but also to break down stereotypes and other barriers to cooperation. The face-to-face conversation is at the heart of building mutual trust, mutual respect, a shared understanding and commitment to the process.<sup>24</sup> In addition, if there is hostility or distrust in the partnership, it is important that the necessary time and cost be invested to restore trust. This does not mean that building trust is separate from decision-making, but that trust is important to avoid the risk of manipulation and undermining of cooperation.<sup>25</sup>

*Practice* In the SIB Joining Forces, face-to-face dialogue is formalised through a three-level consultation structure: operational, tactical and strategic. Consultations are frequent and provide space to discuss obstacles, conflicts and improvements. In the initial phase, many consultations were necessary, but as the SIB progressed, the consultations became more practical, shorter, and more *ad hoc*, and there was more room for making and directing agreements. In addition, many informal consultations also take place between the various parties. The parties describe the cooperation as close and intensive and indicate that they work well with each other. The downside is that parties have had to invest a lot of time in consultation and coordination, which - especially for small service providers - can come at the expense of focusing on the SIB programme itself. Therefore, according to a number of interviewees, the added value and purpose of the consultation structures must be critically examined.

### Shared knowledge development and knowledge use

*Theory* In building mutual trust, shared knowledge is also important.<sup>26</sup> Knowledge includes information from relevant scientific, technical, socio-economic, and cultural sources. The development of a knowledge base is preceded by a process of collecting, weighing up, valuing and assessing information and generating meaning. However, participants in the collaboration have different ways of understanding and accessing information. This makes it important to have shared knowledge development, clarification, and validation for collaboration efficiency and external legitimacy.<sup>27</sup>

*Practice* Within the SIB Joining Forces, there is shared knowledge development by keeping a dashboard with the results of the SIB, where a 'dashboard consultation' is organised so that everyone is aware of the developments and interprets them in the same way. DCR is responsible for managing the data and constructing a dashboard. Due to

<sup>24</sup> See Gilliam, et al. (2002) and Lasker & Weiss (2003).

<sup>25</sup> See Eriksson et al. (2019) and Imperial (2005) and Murdock, Wiessner & Sexton (2005)

<sup>26</sup> See Ansell & Gash (2007).

<sup>27</sup> See Agranoff (2008)

GDPR legislation, other parties do not have access to the data at the participant level. This hampers opportunities to jointly develop knowledge about SIB outcomes. These outcomes are a key component in KPIs, SIB funding and investor payouts, making it important to validate the numbers and ensure quality.

## Dedication and commitment

*Theory* Finally, the degree to which stakeholders are committed to the collaboration is crucial in explaining success or failure.<sup>28</sup> This requires that stakeholders be willing to commit to the decisions of the SIB, even if they do not (fully) support the decision themselves. Dedication is often the result of trusting other stakeholders to respect your perspectives and interests, fair and transparent processes, and ownership of the decision-making process. Commitment often occurs as the outcome of an iterative process of defining, consulting, and determining. Defining refers to the development of shared objectives, a shared and clear delineation of responsibilities and activities, a shared terminology for communication, and shared criteria for assessing information and performance. Consultation is necessary to exchange thoughts and ideas and to resolve problems or conflicts. Finally, it is important that there is output, i.e., arriving at joint agreements, decisions or recommendations.

*Practice* Parties within the SIB generally indicate that they are very involved in decision-making. While all parties have their own roles and responsibilities within the programme, they are also involved in the functioning of the SIB as a whole. That commitment is the result of strong shared goals, open communication, and reflective ability. There is ownership in the decision-making process because the parties are involved in providing input and decision-making through the consultations at operational, tactical and strategic. There is still room for improvement in the coordination between the different interventions. For example, it is indicated that the person reintegrating is currently still going from one intervention to the next, whereas it would be better for the participant if they felt they were completing a single track. This requires further coordination and alignment of interventions.

## 4.3 Structure and Working Method

### Basic rules and delineation of responsibilities

*Theory* Clear ground rules for collaboration and transparency in the process are important for successful collaborative governance.<sup>29</sup> Both contribute to procedural legitimacy and building mutual trust. By setting clear rules and being transparent, stakeholders have confidence that decision-making is fair and equitable and not a cover for backroom deals. For the same reason, it is important to formalise the governance structure, including the rules, procedures, roles and responsibilities.<sup>30</sup>

*Practice* Within the SIB, the basic rules for cooperation are formally laid down in the DAP (Dossiers, Agreements and Procedures) in which all agreements on cooperation, process description and role allocation are recorded. The DAP is adapted in mutual consultation and is the guiding principle for the collaboration. This contributes to procedural legitimacy, transparency and building mutual trust. However, parties do indicate that aligning and recording the DAP is relatively time-consuming, while practice often calls for customisation, which cannot easily be recorded formally. In addition, parties indicate that mutual trust allows them to work with each other in a more informal manner.

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, Crowther et al. (2003).

<sup>29</sup> See Glasbergen & Driessen (2005) and Geoghegan & Renard (2002).

<sup>30</sup> e.g. (Fung & Wright, 2001); Imperial, 2005).

## Adaptability

*Theory* Collaborative governance requires parties to be adaptable.<sup>31</sup> For example, new participants may need to be integrated or new decision-making processes may be required to better reflect changing regulations or leadership. This requires adaptability, which enables organisations to respond quickly to opportunities and challenges. However, that adaptability can be pressured by bureaucratic structures.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, collaboration among different stakeholders is ideally non-hierarchical, informal, and consensus-oriented.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, stability is important for maintaining legitimacy, both inside and outside the organisation.<sup>34</sup> This will require establishing long-term relationships with participating parties to ensure efficient collaboration and consistency in the way we work and communicate externally.

There is therefore a clear trade-off between the adaptability and stability of collaborative governance.<sup>35</sup> Stability requires establishing a bureaucratic entity, but at the expense of organisational flexibility and adaptability. In contrast, a high degree of flexibility and adaptability come at the expense of stability, especially when the pressure is on to be efficient and demonstrate the legitimacy of decision-making.

*Practice* Within the SIB, this trade-off also emerges. On the one hand, a SIB offers the advantage that the client is not contractually bound to parties for a longer period of time. This makes it possible to change the composition of the SIB and to have parties no longer participate in the consortium. This adaptability enables the SIB to respond quickly to opportunities and challenges. On the other hand, performance agreements have been made within the SIB that play an important role in the investment, repayment and continuity of the SIB. These agreements are made before the start of the SIB and - partly because investors invest based on the agreements - can only be adjusted to a limited extent in the interim. This ensures stability, but also limits the SIB's ability to adapt if new (external) developments occur that affect the results.

## 4.4 Leadership

*Theory* Leadership is crucial in bringing parties together and coordinating collaboration.<sup>36</sup> In general, it is important that leadership is focused on orchestrating interactions, exchange, and learning among stakeholders (rather than top-down direction).<sup>37</sup> The literature specifically describes three roles of successful facilitative leadership: guarding the integrity of the decision-making process, mediating between stakeholders, and operating solutions and making decisions.<sup>38</sup> In doing so, the leader must adapt to the situation at hand. In a situation where there is little mutual trust and many conflicts among stakeholders, but an equal balance of power, leadership acts as an *honest broker* that stakeholders can rely on and who is neutral.<sup>39</sup> In a situation where there is an imbalance of power, strong or organic leadership is more effective. The organic leader often already has a certain authority, respect and/or trust among stakeholders.

<sup>31</sup> See Emerson, et al. (2009) and Provan & Kenis (2007).

<sup>32</sup> See William & Lucidarme (2014)

<sup>33</sup> See McGuire (2006) and O'Learly & Vij (2012)

<sup>34</sup> See Provan & Kenis (2007).

<sup>35</sup> See Provan & Kenis, (2007).

<sup>36</sup> e.g., Murdock et al. (2005) and Frame, Gunton, & Day (2004).

<sup>37</sup> See Eriksson et al. (2019)

<sup>38</sup> See Susskind & Cruickshank (1987)

<sup>39</sup> See Ashell & Gash (2007)

*Practice* The authority to coordinate and direct the SIB lies with IncluSIF. They are the main contractor and have a contract with investors and service providers. However, the Ministry of Defence also has a major role in directing the SIB in terms of implementation. As stated earlier, decision-making is largely consensus-based and involves all parties. Some parties indicate that this takes a lot of time and that too few priorities are set, so that a lot of attention is paid to what they see as relatively unimportant topics. This makes the SIB less responsive. Therefore, there is a need among some parties to designate one party to guard the line and have the authority to weigh the value of consultations for importance and efficiency.

## 4.5 Results

*Theory* A number of studies show that collaboration is more successful when the goals and added value of the collaboration are relatively concrete and when short-term impact is possible (*small wins*).<sup>40</sup> Funding instruments such as those of the SIB are based on performance agreements, whereby both funding and payment are based on results. This set-up makes SIBs more likely to manage for results, for example by using performance rewards or settlements based on results. Achieving results can create a positive cycle of trust and commitment.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, the risk of managing for results is that parties will focus too heavily on the target group that is more likely to produce results early (*cherry picking* or *cream skimming*). This can lead to the exclusion of more disadvantaged groups (*parking*).

*Practice* There are also *small wins* in the case of the SIB Joining Forces: the objectives of the cooperation are very concrete and results of the efforts are visible in the short term. This is because service provision has a direct impact on the (job opportunities and work resumption of) persons reintegrating. In addition, within the SIB there is a strong focus on achieving results. For example, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the service providers that are linked to the overall goals of the SIB are used. This creates a constant incentive for service providers to perform. A downside of the focus on results - according to some stakeholders - is that service providers focus heavily on promising persons reintegrating who are expected to produce results sooner. While this benefits the bottom line, it may come at the expense of service quality and may lead to more frequent surrender of difficult cases. In this case, the focus on results clashes with the importance of accessibility and service quality.

## 4.6 Improvement Opportunities

This section presents a number of possible modifications based on the concerns from the above process evaluation. A distinction was made between adjustments in cooperation, structure and working method, leadership and results management. It is crucial to identify trade-offs in this process. For example, an improvement in one aspect is often accompanied by a deterioration in another. In addition, when considering options, stakeholder support and feasibility are important. Trade-offs, support, and feasibility should all be considered in a decision about implementing the improvement options.

<sup>40</sup> See Weech-Maldonado & Merrill (2000)

<sup>41</sup> See Rogers et al. (1993) and Vangen & Huxham (2003).

Table 4.1 Overview of areas of concern and improvement opportunities

Theme	Topic	Area of concern	Improvement Opportunity
Collaboration	Consultation and mutual trust	A lot of time is invested in consultation and coordination, which may come at the expense of focus on SIB programme	(1) Reconsider importance and efficiency of consultation structure
	Shared knowledge development and knowledge use	Knowledge development on results is mainly in the hands of DCR.	(2) Independent audit of outcome measurements
	Dedication and commitment	Limited coordination between interventions	(3) Increased attention to transfer between interventions.
Structure and Working Method	Basic rules and delineation of responsibilities	A lot of time is invested in establishing DAP, while practice calls for customisation	(4) Less documentation and more collaboration based on trust
	Adaptability	Little room for adjustment in performance agreements during the process	(5) Include more scenarios and risks in performance agreements up front
Leadership	Facilitative leadership	Prioritisation and decisiveness	(6) Clear line in steering SIB, apply more prioritisation
Results	Managing for results	Too little guidance on difficult cases	(7) Broader use of service provision

*Improvement Opportunity 1: reconsider importance and efficiency of consultation structure*

Parties invest a lot of time in consultation and coordination, which - especially for small service providers - can come at the expense of focusing on the SIB programme itself. According to a number of parties, the added value and purpose of the consultation structures must therefore be critically examined. However, this may be at the expense of the involvement and joint decision-making of the parties, which is a key factor in the success of the SIB.

*Improvement Opportunity 2: independent auditing of outcome measurements*

DCR periodically provides a dashboard showing the results of the SIB. These results are a key component in the KPIs, the funding of the SIB and the payout to investors. Therefore, to ensure the quality of the results measurements, it is advisable to have the figures audited periodically by an independent party. This party should not be part of the SIB consortium and should have no interest in the results of the SIB.

*Improvement Opportunity 3: more attention to transfer between interventions*

There is room for improvement in coordination between interventions. The goal here may be to make the person reintegrating feel like they are going through one cohesive SIB programme rather than several interventions. This will require increased coordination between the different service providers and case managers. The flip side of this is that service providers in particular have little capacity to expand consultation structures. Ideally, therefore, coordination should be ad hoc, informal, efficient, and focused on the content of the SIB programme.

*Improvement Opportunity 4: record less and work more together on the basis of trust*

A lot of time is invested in establishing and recording the agreements, processes and responsibilities in the DAP. A number of parties indicate that there should be room for customisation. One possibility for improvement, therefore, is to shift the focus more away from formally recording mutual agreements and procedures, and instead rely more on trust and informal consultation. One risk, however, is that this comes at the expense of procedural legitimacy of decision-making, transparency and mutual trust.

*Improvement Opportunity 5: include more scenarios and risks in performance agreements in advance*

The performance agreements that form the basis of the SIB funding model offer little room for adjustment in the event of unexpected developments. One possibility for improvement is to work with scenarios and risks in a new phase. For example, clauses can be included regarding funding in the event of fewer or more entrants. Another possibility is to make the result dependent on the business cycle. After all, it is more difficult to place persons reintegrating in a tight labour market than in an slack one. By taking possible developments into account, the consequences of external developments are less decisive for the distribution of costs and benefits of the SIB.

*Improvement opportunity 6: clear line in steering SIB*

Decision-making within the SIB is focused on consensus, with the parties jointly setting the agenda and making decisions. This, according to some parties, creates inefficiencies in the content, frequency and duration of consultations. Therefore, one possibility for improvement is to give one party the authority to monitor the line, set priorities and determine the agenda, frequency and duration of consultations. This promotes decisiveness and reduces the time investment in consultation and coordination. One downside is that this may come at the expense of the parties' commitment and joint decision-making, which is a key factor in the success of the SIB.

*Improvement opportunity 7: use service provision more broadly*

The guidance of disadvantaged persons reintegrating/difficult cases in the SIB can be intensified. Currently, difficult cases, such as demotivated participants, do not always go through to the SIB and then remain with Ministry of Defence case managers. Especially when a person reintegrating does not want to cooperate right away, a coach or supervisor can play an important role in getting someone to go along without the need for sanctions. One solution to bring these cases into the SIB more often is, for example, to weigh the placement of disadvantaged persons reintegrating more heavily in the KPIs. This would give service providers an incentive to adapt to working with difficult cases, such as demotivated participants, and case managers may have more confidence that difficult cases will also come into their own within the SIB.

## 4.7 Interim conclusion and follow-up research

The process evaluation conducted provides insight into the organisation of the SIB. At its core, investors fund reintegration service providers who use interventions to try to place long-term sick military personnel in jobs. This includes a fund manager responsible for attracting investment and structuring and coordinating the SIB. Clear agreements were made in advance about the objectives and the results to be achieved for the central target group. If the predetermined results are achieved, the Ministry of Defence repays the investors with returns through the fund manager. If the results are not satisfactory, the investors lose their money. This form of financing is also known as results-based financing (or *pay for success*). As a result, all parties within the SIB have a strong common focus on achieving results. Partly for this reason, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are used for the service providers, which are linked to the overall goals of the SIB.

There is close cooperation between the Ministry of Defence, the service providers and the fund manager on implementation of the SIB. This collaboration is structured around formally established agreements (the DAP) and frequent consultations at the operational, tactical and strategic levels. Additional dashboard consultations are held in which the results of the SIB are discussed, ensuring joint knowledge development. In addition to the formal consultations, many (bilateral) informal consultations take place between the various parties. This collaborative process is generally perceived by the parties as positive, with commonality of objectives, ownership in decision-making, short lines of communication and open communication being cited as strengths.

Nonetheless, a number of concerns have emerged from the study. For example, parties have to invest a great deal of time in consultation and coordination, which - especially for small service providers - can come at the expense of focusing on the SIB programme itself. Some solutions include (i) increased collaboration based on trust (ii) giving one party the authority to guard the line, set priorities, and set the agenda; and (iii) critically rethinking the shared purpose and added value of the consultations. In addition, according to a number of parties, more time should actually be made for further coordination between the various interventions. It would be better for the participant if they feel they are following a single track, which is currently not always the case. Finally, there are a number of concerns regarding the result-oriented management. On the one hand, this concerns building in more *checks and balances* in determining the results, for example through independent auditing. On the other hand, more attention should be paid to the relatively difficult cases, which are currently not always included in the SIB and more often remain with the Ministry of Defence case managers. One solution to bring these cases into the SIB more often is, for example, to weigh the placement of disadvantaged persons reintegrating more heavily in the KPIs.

### Follow-up research

A follow-up to this evaluation of the SIB Joining Forces will expand the process evaluation by including more documentation in the evaluation. The study has so far been able to make only limited use of documentation such as the DAP and performance agreements used within the SIB. Insight into this documentation is essential in order to delve deeper into processes, procedures and results management within the SIB. The process evaluation will also be expanded by conducting more frequent periodic interviews with stakeholders. This helps to monitor the progress of the SIB and relate this to how the organisation is contributing to the achievement of the intended results. In doing so, we periodically provide feedback on what lessons can be learned with respect to optimising the organisation within the SIB. This should help to further improve the results of the SIB.



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